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CREATING HAMMER V. DAGENHART
Logan E. Sawyer III*
INTRODUCTION
In a series of decisions in the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court recog-
nized for the first time that Congress could use its power to regulate interstate com-
merce to promote the health, safety, morality, and general welfare of the nation. The
decisions that recognized what was called a “federal police power”—Champion v.
Ames,1 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,2 and Hoke v. United States3—were celebrated
by turn-of-the-century progressives who were increasingly looking to the national gov-
ernment to address social welfare problems, especially those created by “race to the
bottom,” degenerative competition among the States.4 In 1918, however, the Court sig-
nificantly limited that authority. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,5 the Court allowed Congress
to exercise its federal police power only when prohibiting the interstate shipment of
harmful goods.6 Congress, according to the Court, could prohibit the interstate ship-
ment of intrinsically harmful goods, like immoral lottery tickets or impure food, but
not items that were in themselves harmless, like the products of child labor.7
Since it was decided, Hammer and the harmless items limit it adopted have been
subject to withering criticism.8 The decision is widely considered inconsistent with
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Cushman, Dan Ernst, Gordon Hylton, Charles McCurdy, Eric Muller, Laura Phillips, Lori
Ringhand, Mark Tushnet, Ron Wright, and the participants of the Southeastern Junior/Senior
Faculty Workshop. Nicholas Rolader provided able research assistance.
1 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
2 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
3 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
4 Hoke, 227 U.S. at 320–23; Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 57–58; Champion , 188 U.S.
at 344; William Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation
of Reform, 64 J. AM. HIST. 331 (1977) (chronicling the Progressive Movement and the fight
for uniformity of state legislation).
5 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 270–73.
8 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS 18, 253
(1936) (describing Hammer as “shockingly lacking in precedential antecedents” and placing
it in the “era of laissez faire-ism on the Bench”); 2 ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON
& HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 418 (7th
ed. 1991) (“Seemingly irrefutable authority for the [child labor] act existed in Supreme Court
pronouncements.”); THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
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precedent, incoherent as policy, and the product of a backward looking, politicized
commitment to a laissez faire economy.9 This paper challenges those claims. It argues
that this conventional understanding is wrong in at least three respects: (1) it underesti-
mates the coherence of the Court’s federal police power as it developed from Champion
to Hammer; (2) it mischaracterizes the policies that produced the harmless items limit;
and (3) it ignores the central role lawyers outside the Supreme Court played in shap-
ing early federal police power doctrine. Given the prominent place of Hammer in the
canon of constitutional law,10 and the central role it plays in supporting a contested
understanding of the Lochner Court, those errors threaten to distort the profession’s
understanding of constitutional development.11
INTERPRETATION 65–71 (1956); STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 180–83 (1968) (reviewing the contemporary negative response to the
Hammer decision); Kent Greenfield, Law, Politics, and the Erosion of Legitimacy in the
Delaware Courts, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 481, 487 (2010–2011) (characterizing the reasoning
in Hammer as “incoherent, unworkable, and transparently political”); see also infra notes 48–50
and accompanying text. But see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 393
(1993) (“Given the state of Commerce Clause doctrine at the time of the Hammer decision,
[the majority’s] position was not startling. . . . Since the Court had accepted distinctions between
‘manufacture’ and ‘commerce’ in construing the Commerce Clause, it was not unreasonable
to argue that the Act was an effort to stretch that clause to impermissible limits . . . .”).
9 See, e.g., KELLY ET AL., supra note 8, at 416–19 (dismissing the harmless items rule
and criticizing doctrinal inconsistencies between Hammer and prior precedent); 1 LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828 n.10 (3d ed. 2000) (calling Hammer the “first,
and probably most egregious,” of federalism cases in which the Court “departed in an unprin-
cipled way from its precedents and confused Commerce Clause jurisprudence” with the harm-
less items rule used to distinguish prior precedent on “transparently unconvincing ground”);
Greenfield, supra note 8, at 487 (describing Hammer as evidence that “the Supreme Court was
so committed to a jurisprudence of laissez-faire that it used virtually every tool at its disposal to
fight the ability of state and federal governments to regulate the economy”); Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1230 (1986) (claiming
that the Hammer decision reveals the Court’s “continuing distaste for government interfer-
ence with that most hallowed feature of the market economy: the employment contract” and,
along with Lochner is “illustrative of the difficult task the Court faced in translating its ideo-
logical commitment to an autonomous sphere of property rights into coherent boundaries on
public regulation”); see also infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
10 Hammer is a staple of constitutional law courses and casebooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM
C. BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR
FEDERAL SYSTEM 373–77 (6th ed. 2010); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 253 (3d ed. 2006); DAVID CRUMP, EUGENE GRESSMAN, DAVID S. DAY
& CHARLES W. “ROCKY” RHODES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115–16
(5th ed. 2009); DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY
844–47 (4th ed. 2009); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
89–91 (16th ed. 2007).
11 See infra Part I.B, which discusses the scholarly reception of Hammer and its impli-
cations for our understanding of constitutional development.
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To support these claims, this Article looks beyond the traditional sources of judi-
cial opinions and the papers of Supreme Court Justices, which provide little insight into
the origins of the doctrine adopted in Hammer. It looks instead to the public career and
rich private papers of the lawyer primarily responsible for establishing, propagating,
and defending both the federal police power and the harmless items limit: Philander
Chase Knox. Knox, though largely forgotten by lawyers, was a leading attorney of his
day; who was asked to join the Court three times by two Presidents.12 More importantly,
he stood at the center of the doctrinal evolution that produced Hammer. As Attorney
General, he shaped the establishment of the federal police power when he oversaw
the litigation in Champion v. Ames;13 as a United States Senator, he helped define the
limits of the doctrine in debates over the legislation that led to the decision in Hipolite
Egg;14 and as a Presidential candidate and nationally respected lawyer he defended the
doctrine’s limits in the legal literature.15 Knox, in other words, was a fine lawyer who
knew more about the emergence of the federal police power and its limits than anyone
of his time.
Knox’s work and ideas demonstrate that the harmless items limit was not invented
in Hammer v. Dagenhart by a Supreme Court dedicated to promoting a laissez-faire
economic order. It was instead an attempt by political moderates to reform Commerce
Clause doctrine so that it could address the challenges of a new century while pre-
serving what they saw as valuable in existing doctrine. Knox and his contemporaries
constructed the harmless items limit more than a decade before Hammer in order to
empower Congress to address the problems created by an increasingly integrated
national economy while protecting traditional values of federalism, free trade, and
freedom of contract.16 The doctrine adopted in Hammer was not, in short, an attempt
to return America to an imagined laissez-faire past, but was a half-way house on the
road to modern Commerce Clause doctrine.
Knox’s interaction with the Hammer doctrine, however, does more than illuminate
the origins of the harmless items limit. It also provides a case study of the way lawyers
outside of the courtroom shape the development of constitutional law. Knox’s work
12 Letter from Philander Knox, U.S. Sec’y of State, to William Howard Taft, U.S. President
(Nov. 29, 1911), in THE PAPERS OF PHILANDER C. KNOX, 1893–1922 (on file with the Library
of Congress) [hereinafter THE KNOX PAPERS]; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President,
to Philander Knox, U.S. Senator of Pa. (Mar. 3, 1906), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra; Letter
from William Howard Taft, U.S. President, to Philander Knox, U.S. Sec’y of State (Nov. 29,
1911), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra.
13 Philander Chase Knox: Forty-Fourth Attorney General 1901–1904, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistprint.php?id=43 (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
14 See 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 457–60
(1922); see also infra note 177 and accompanying text.
15 Philander C. Knox, The Development of the Federal Power to Regulate Commerce,
17 YALE L.J. 139 (1908) (arguing for limits to the reach of the federal police power while
defending the harmless item limit).
16 Id.
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reconfigured the way Congress understood its authority and thus determined the legal
and legislative precedents that framed the debate in Hammer. His ideas and those prec-
edents defined the approach the litigants brought to Hammer and ultimately provided
the doctrinal structure the Court adopted. Knox thus helps us see a reality that remains
true today: that constitutional development results from a clash of ideological and polit-
ical forces whose demands are balanced, refined, and integrated into established legal
structures by politically involved lawyers long before the Court plays its undoubtedly
important, but still limited, role of choosing the winning side.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly describes the decisions that estab-
lished the federal police power and summarizes the contemporary view of Hammer.
Part II introduces Philander Knox and describes the pivotal role he played in recon-
figuring early twentieth-century Commerce Clause doctrine. Part III demonstrates that
the harmless items limit was not invented in Hammer by Justices in 1918, but was in-
stead a widely accepted limit to Congress’s commerce power as early as 1907—more
than a decade before Hammer was decided. Part IV draws on Knox’s private papers
and public acts to argue that the harmless items limit was not motivated by a com-
mitment to a laissez-faire economy. Part V provides an alternate explanation of the
emergence of the harmless items limit, contends that Knox and others supported that
limit because it permitted the federal government to address self-defeating competi-
tion among states in an increasingly integrated national economy while simultaneously
protecting free trade, federalism, and freedom of contract. Part VI assesses Knox’s
contribution to the Hammer decision.
I. THE FEDERAL POLICE POWER AND THE HARMLESS ITEMS LIMIT
Hammer has been long overruled, but it remains central to a long established under-
standing of the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century, and that understand-
ing, in turn, has been seen as having important implications for modern constitutional
theory. Part I.A describes the crucial role Hammer played in early twentieth-century
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part I.B then describes how commentators built on
Justice Holmes’s classic dissent to depict the decision as a retrograde abuse of judicial
power by Lochner era Justices dedicated to protecting a laissez-faire economy that
advantaged business interests at the expense of the people.17 It is this modern under-
standing of Hammer that the remainder of this article challenges.
A. The Road to Hammer
The recognition of the federal police power in Champion v. Ames in 1903 marked
a significant departure from the traditional understanding of federalism, known as
Dual Federalism.18 Nineteenth-century jurists constructed Dual Federalism from the
17 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
18 1 DONALD P. KOMMERS, JOHN E. FINN & GARY J. JACOBSOHN, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND DEMOCRACY 326 (3d. ed. 2010).
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enumeration of powers in Article I and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of all non-
enumerated powers to the States or to the people.19 Congress had exclusive power over
interstate commerce and other subjects enumerated in Article I, Section 8, while the
States had exclusive authority over subjects not delegated, including, most impor-
tantly, the “police power”: the power to promote public health, safety, morality, and
general welfare. Because Dual Federalism saw state and federal power as mutually
exclusive spheres, the exercise of the police power was considered beyond federal
competence. Judges were to enforce this system by using their legal expertise to guard
the boundaries between the different areas of state and federal authority.20
Courts in the late nineteenth century kept Congress’s commerce power from vio-
lating that boundary by limiting the purposes that the commerce power could serve. In
Champion v. Ames, for example, the Court considered whether a federal regulation pro-
hibiting the movement of lottery tickets in interstate commerce was within Congress’s
power to “regulate commerce.”21 The dissent, in a classic Dual Federalism opinion,
argued the law was not a regulation of commerce because the power to regulate com-
merce was limited to the end of promoting and protecting interstate trade.22 Prohibit-
ing interstate trade in lottery tickets—or any other good—was beyond Congressional
authority because it did not advance that goal; it sought instead to protect morality.23
The majority opinion in Champion v. Ames, however, created a new approach by
upholding a prohibition on the movement of lottery tickets in interstate commerce.24
The Champion majority rejected the contention that the commerce power could only
be used to promote or protect interstate trade. That approach would leave activities that
government should be able to regulate beyond the authority of both state and federal
power, something never intended by the framers of the Constitution. Interstate com-
merce in lottery tickets threatened the nation’s morality, but the dissent’s approach kept
it from being regulated by the states because it was interstate, and kept it from being
regulated by the federal government because it was harmful only to non-economic
interests. “We should hesitate long,” Justice Harlan wrote for the majority, “before
adjudging that an evil of such appalling character . . . cannot be met and crushed by
the only power competent to that end.”25
The establishment of a federal police power in Champion was supported by two
other decisions: Hoke v. United States and Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States.26 There,
19 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4, 15–16 (1950).
20 Id. at 2, 15–16.
21 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 324 (1903) (holding that prohibiting the movement
of lottery tickets in interstate commerce was within Congress’s power to regulate commerce).
22 Id. at 366–71 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 364–65, 372–74.
24 Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
25 Id. at 357–58.
26 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45 (1911).
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the Court approved the use of the commerce power to ban the interstate movement
of prostitutes and adulterated food and drugs.27 None of those decisions, however,
clearly defined the limits on that authority, and Hoke suggested that the power was
sweeping indeed.28
Hoke was seen by many as consistent with previous decisions on the narrow
ground that in Champion, Hipolite, and Hoke, Congress had prohibited the use of
interstate commerce only to prevent interstate commerce from being used as a con-
duit for harmful goods or transactions. Indeed, Justice Day’s opinion for a unani-
mous Court in McDermott v. Wisconsin29 suggested the Court took that perspective.30
McDermott was decided shortly after Hoke, and there, in dicta, the Court reasoned
that the Pure Food and Drug Act was constitutional because it prohibited the inter-
state shipment of harmful goods:
That Congress has ample power [to pass the Pure Food and
Drug Act] is no longer open to question. That body has the right
not only to pass laws which shall regulate legitimate commerce
among the States and with foreign nations, but has full power to
keep the channels of such commerce free from the transportation
of illicit or harmful articles, . . . and to bar them from facilities and
privileges thereof.
. . . .
The object of the statute is to prevent the misuse of the fa-
cilities of interstate commerce in conveying . . . misbranded and
adulterated articles of medicine or food . . . .31
But Hoke also contained language that indicated the Court had approved a simple and
much broader principle: that Congress could prohibit the movement of anything in in-
terstate commerce if the prohibition ultimately promoted the health, safety, morality,
or general welfare of the nation.32 Justice McKenna wrote for the majority that:
the principle established by the cases is the simple one, when rid of
confusing and distracting considerations, that Congress has power
over transportation “among the several States”; that the power
27 Hoke, 227 U.S. at 308–09; Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 45–46.
28 Hoke, 227 U.S. at 308–09; Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 45–46; Champion, 188 U.S.
at 363 (“The whole subject is too important, and the questions suggested by its consideration
are too difficult of solution, to justify any attempt to lay down a rule for determining in advance
the validity of every statute that may be enacted under the commerce clause.”).
29 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
30 Id. at 115, 128–31 (1913).
31 Id. at 128, 131.
32 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 8, at 418 (citing Hoke, 227 U.S. 308).
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is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may
adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and
the means may have the quality of police regulations.33
Advocates of child labor reform seized on that principle to argue that Congress could
promote the health and welfare of the nation by prohibiting the interstate shipment of
products produced by child labor. Congress, in turn, passed the Keating-Owen Child
Labor Law,34 which imposed just such a ban.35
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, however, the Court invalidated this landmark legisla-
tion.36 The federal police power cases did not, argued Justice Day for the five-Justice
majority, permit Congress to prohibit the interstate movement of any article of com-
merce in order to advance police power ends.37 The result of such an interpretation
would be the end of “all freedom of commerce” and the “elimina[tion]” of “the power
of the States over local matters.”38 Champion, Hipolite, and Hoke permitted Congress
to advance police power ends by prohibiting the interstate movement of goods only
when the goods were themselves harmful. Laws banning the interstate shipment of lot-
tery tickets, prostitutes, or impure food and drugs, Justice Day explained, were upheld
because those goods were harmful in themselves.39 “[T]he use of interstate transpor-
tation,” he wrote, was thus “necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results.”40
The child labor law, however, prohibited the interstate movement of harmless goods
and was therefore not a regulation of commerce.41 It was instead an attempt to use the
commerce power to regulate manufacturing, an area of authority reserved for the states
by the Tenth Amendment.
Hammer inspired one of the most famous dissents by the Court’s “great dissenter.”
The power to regulate commerce, Justice Holmes wrote for himself and three others,
was given to Congress in “unqualified terms.”42 He then resolutely rejected Day’s claim
that Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of only harmful items. Champion,
Holmes claimed, had clearly recognized that Congress could prohibit interstate com-
merce and “[t]he notion that prohibition is any less prohibition when applied to
things now thought evil,” he believed senseless.43 Since prohibition of commerce
was an appropriate way to regulate commerce—“[r]egulation means the prohibition
33 Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323.
34 Keating-Owen (Child Labor) Act, Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916), invalidated
by Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
35 Id.
36 Hammer, 247 U.S. 251.
37 Id. at 270–72, 276.
38 Id. at 276.
39 Id. at 269–70.
40 Id. at 271.
41 Id. at 271–72.
42 Id. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 278, 280.
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of something,” he reasoned—the question of when to prohibit was a decision for
Congress, not the Court.44 “It is not for this Court,” he wrote, “to say that [prohibition]
is permissible as against strong drink but not as against the product of ruined lives.”45
He then turned the assumptions of Dual Federalism against the majority. “The act,”
he argued, “does not meddle with anything belonging to the States. They may regu-
late their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek
to send their products across the state line they are no longer within their rights.”46
“The national welfare as understood by Congress,” he concluded, “may require a
different attitude within its sphere from that of some self-seeking State. It seems to
me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding by all the means
at its command.”47
B. The Reception and Critique of Hammer
The commentary on Hammer has overwhelmingly adopted Holmes’s perspec-
tive. Hammer, according to that conventional view, was inconsistent with Champion,
Hipolite, and especially Hoke.48 Those cases recognized that prohibition was a form
of regulation and that Congress could regulate interstate commerce in pursuit of ends
other than protecting or promoting interstate trade. The Hammer majority, however,
ignored that precedent and then established a rule that was simply nonsensical: that
Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of harmful but not harmless goods.49
The majority, the conventional view concludes, ignored Holmes’s incisive dissent
44 Id. at 277–78.
45 Id. at 280.
46 Id. at 281.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, at 828 n.10 (criticizing the harmless items rule for being
on “transparently unconvincing ground”); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: 1910–1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1123 (1985) (“It is hard to believe that the [Hammer]
majority found its own distinctions [from the Champion line of precedent] persuasive.”);
Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L. REV. 61, 63
(1922) (calling Justice Day’s distinction of Hammer from other cases a “grievous error”);
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The White Court, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
2055, 2058 (Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1986) (“The
reasoning [of the majority in Hammer] was entirely question-begging . . . [and] flatly incon-
sistent with the opinion in Hipolite Egg and Hoke.”); Norman R. Williams, The Commerce
Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1888 (2007) (noting
Hammer’s doctrinal inconsistency with the Court’s supposed commitment to formalism and
dual federalism).
49 See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 10, at 846 (“Why isn’t a product of child labor just
as much an ‘outlaw of commerce’ as adulterated food (Hipolite Egg) or lottery tickets (The
Lottery Case)?”); KELLY ET AL., supra note 8, at 447 (referring to the harmless items rule as
“an unconvincing exercise in judicial ingenuity”); Vanue B. Lacour, The Misunderstanding
and Misuse of the Commerce Clause, 30 S.U. L. REV. 187, 195 (2003) (“The majority opin-
ion in Hammer also clouded the issues by reasoning that the proscribed activity in the earlier
cases was noxious whereas child labor was not . . . .”).
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and adopted this nonsensical rule because of its ideological commitment to a laissez-
faire economic order.50
That traditional understanding of Hammer contributes to a broader historical
narrative that in turn supports a particular understanding of the role of lawyers and
legal doctrine in the process of constitutional development. The conventional view
of Hammer is regularly joined with what has been the conventional view of Lochner
v. New York51 to indict the early twentieth-century Supreme Court for manipulating
meaningless legal forms to protect a laissez-faire economy that privileged powerful
business interests at the expense of workers, the people, and even children. In Lochner
the Court used the Due Process Clause to fight economic regulations; in Hammer it
used the Commerce Clause, but both demonstrate the same commitment to protecting
business interests from government regulation.52
50 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 252–53 (noting the deep commitment by
Justices of the era to laissez-faire economics and the possible willingness of the Court to
defer on morals regulations, but not those of an economic nature); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 146 (1960) (referring to the Hammer decision as a means
by which the Supreme Court attempted to resist “public control of the nation’s economy”);
WALLACE MENDELSON, CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 86 (1960)
(citing Hammer as an example of “pseudo-laissez-faire cre[eping] into the Constitution”);
J. M. Balkin, Federalism and the Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. LAW. 459, 477–80 (1987)
(claiming Hammer was an example of the Supreme Court using federalism as one of “several
different doctrinal strategies for achieving laissez-faire”); Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State
Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1672 n.257 (2002) (claiming Hammer “constitutionalized
laissez faire economics”); Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract,
Federalism, and the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 233 (2011) (calling Hammer
a “pointed example of this laissez-faire inspired hostility to federal power”); John P. Roche,
Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power: Expansion, Contraction, and Casuistry
in the Age of Enterprise, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 680, 702–03 (1963) (arguing that Commerce
Clause precedent was flexible enough that a case could be decided based on the majority’s
economic philosophies); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1068 n.380 (1992) (“The
Court in Hammer . . . reverted to its fiercest model of laissez-faire . . . .”).
51 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
52 Chemerinsky, for example, notes that during the early twentieth century, the Court
aggressively reviewed state economic regulations on the grounds that they impermissibly
interfered with freedom of contract and also “used federalism to limit the ability of Congress
to regulate the economy.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 622–23. “Although the doctrines
used were different,” he concludes, “they were inspired by the same philosophy: a strong com-
mitment to a laissez-faire economy and to protecting business from government regulations.”
Id. at 623. See also LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
1877–1917 185–87 (1971) (examining due process and laissez-faire principles as basis for
the Lochner decision); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 50, at 158–61 (describing the laissez-faire
mentality of the Court following Lochner); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 206–08 (1969) (describing the laissez-faire means of decision-
making of Hammer); Memorandum from J. S. Young, Biographical Sketch of Philander C.
Knox 1665 (1904), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12 (“Decisions like Hammer v.
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That indictment of the turn-of-the-century Supreme Court has, in turn, supported
a particular view of the judicial process. By purporting to prove that constitutional
development at the turn of the twentieth century was driven solely by the policy
preferences of the Justices of the Supreme Court, that indictment has supported a
generalized jurisprudential view that constitutional law is nothing more than the policy
preferences of the Supreme Court’s Justices. The “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court
behavior adopted by many political scientists is the purest example of this approach,
but there are both historians and lawyers who adopt similar perspectives.53 That narrow
focus on the Justices’ policy preferences rejects—or at least severely minimizes—the
contribution actors other than Justices make to constitutional development and deni-
grates the potential of legal doctrine itself to shape judicial behavior.
The historical understanding of the turn-of-the-century Supreme Court that sup-
ports this reductionist understanding of constitutional law has been under increasing
attack. Beginning in the 1970s, scholars began pointing out that Justices who had been
considered paradigmatic examples of pro-business, laissez-faire ideologues in fact
upheld significant regulations of the economy and argued that their behavior is better
explained as an attempt to prevent legislatures from promoting the interests of a nar-
row class.54 That revisionism has recently been extended to the decision that has given
the era its name. Lochner itself has been increasingly understood as having its roots
in an abolitionist concern with free labor and a long-standing judicial concern with the
influence of factions in politics.55
Dagenhart, which used the Commerce Clause to protect an exclusive zone of state regulatory
authority from federal child labor legislation, are now viewed in exactly the same light as
Lochner v. New York . . . .”).
53 See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64–73 (1993) (outlining the attitudinal model and how it applies to the
Supreme Court); Howard Gillman, What Has Law Got to Do with It?: Judicial Behaviorists
Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001)
(discussing the attitudinal model and its criticisms).
54 See generally ALAN R. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS
MCINTYRE COOLEY 79, 122–65 (1987) (analyzing the laissez-faire politics of the Court through
Justice Thomas Cooley); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
of the Meanings and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293
(1985) (describing laissez-faire constitutionalism in relation to the economic view of human
liberty); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST.
970, 973 (1975) (arguing that Justice Field’s jurisprudence was not grounded in Social
Darwinism but rather an attempt to define the “government’s legitimate role in American
economic life”).
55 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 48–55 (1993) (expounding on past scholar-
ship and arguing that the Lochner era jurisprudence was a post–Civil War response to faction-
alized politics). But see DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011) (arguing that 
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No one, however, has attempted to re-examine the decision in Hammer, despite its
visibility and its importance to that traditional narrative. The remainder of this article
attempts to provide a part of that re-examination by recovering the political, legal,
and ideological origins of the harmless items limit the Court adopted in Hammer.
It does so by looking beyond the traditional sources of judicial opinions and the pa-
pers of Supreme Court Justices. Those sources provide little insight into the origins
of the harmless items limit, perhaps explaining why Hammer has not yet been re-
examined. The opinion itself is vague and formalistic, especially in comparison to
Justice Holmes’s biting dissent, and studies of the Justices on the Court have found
little that casts additional light.56 Most importantly, the origins of the harmless items
limit do not lie in Supreme Court opinions. That doctrine had a nearly decade long
life before it was formally adopted by the Supreme Court in Hammer, a life that can
be revealed by examining the rich private papers and active public life of Philander
Knox. The following part explains the central role Knox played in the creation of the
harmless items limit.
II. THE HARMLESS ITEMS LIMIT AND PHILANDER KNOX
Knox would not have accepted the conventional understanding of Hammer. That
story, he surely would have said, underestimates the coherence of the harmless items
limit and mischaracterizes the policies it supported. It also, he might have said in an
expansive moment, ignores his efforts to establish, propagate, and defend those ideas.
Knox’s opinion on those issues deserves consideration nearly 100 years after his death
because he was a talented and insightful lawyer who played a central role in the devel-
opment of both the federal police power and the harmless items limit.
Knox’s legal acumen is clear from his career in private practice and public service.
After serving as an Assistant United States Attorney,57 he founded a Pittsburgh firm
that continues today as Reed Smith LLP.58 He counted the enormous Carnegie Steel
Lochner was grounded not in concerns with class legislation but in precedent and a natural
rights tradition).
56 See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF [sic] JUSTICE JAMES
CLARK MCREYNOLDS 60 n.61 (1992); ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE
48–49 (1981); JOSEPH E. MCLEAN, WILLIAM RUFUS DAY 76–81, 111–12 (1946); David
Burner, Willis Van Devanter, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789–1969, at 1945 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, eds., 1969); Fred L. Israel, Mahlon
Pitney, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789–1969, at 2001 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel, eds., 1969); James F. Watts, Jr., William R. Day, in 3 THE JUSTICES
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789–1969, at 1773, 1790 (Leon Friedman & Fred
L. Israel eds., 1969).
57 Archibald J. Dodds, The Public Services of Philander Knox 7 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh); Young, supra note 52, at 3.
58 RALPH H. DEMMLER, THE FIRST CENTURY OF AN INSTITUTION, REED SMITH SHAW &
MCCLAY 6 (1977); Young, supra note 52, at 4.
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Company and related H. C. Frick Coke Company among his clients.59 His turn-of-the-
century income was estimated at $150,000 per year—roughly $4,000,000 in today’s
dollars.60 Perhaps the best measure of his success as a private attorney was the rumor
of his representation of the Indianapolis Traction Company.61 Knox was supposedly
retained as “assistant counsel” to former President Benjamin Harrison. Harrison re-
putedly received an unheard of fee of $25,000.62 Knox received $100,000.63
Knox left private practice to become Attorney General. He was appointed to the
post by President William McKinley,64 then President Theodore Roosevelt retained
him after McKinley’s assassination. He quickly became one of Roosevelt’s most im-
portant advisors.65 He left the executive branch in 1904 to represent Pennsylvania in
the Senate,66 where he was appointed to the Judiciary Committee.67 The best evidence
of his legal talent, however, is that he may hold the record for most Supreme Court
nominations declined. Roosevelt offered him the seats eventually taken by Justices
Moody and Day.68 Taft offered him the seat of retiring Justice John Marshall Harlan.69
That Knox was offered legal positions of such influence indicates that his legal
views were far from idiosyncratic. So too do his political activities. He served as chair-
man of the powerful Rules Committee,70 was a serious candidate for the Republican
Party’s presidential nomination in 1908 and 1916, and served as Taft’s Secretary of
State.71 In his public positions, he generally sided with the conservative “old guard”
of his party against the progressive “insurgent” wing when forced to choose. He sup-
ported Taft when Theodore Roosevelt split the Republican Party in two in his 1912 pro-
gressive “Bull Moose” campaign for President,72 and he was a consistent defender of
59 Dodds, supra note 57, at 8–9; Young, supra note 52, at 4.
60 L. A. Coolidge, Attorney-General Knox, Lawyer: The Trust Question is a Question of
Law—in His Hands, 19 MCCLURE’S MAG. 471, 473 (1902). See Consumer Price Index
(Estimate) 1800–, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolisfed
.org/community_education/teacher/calc/hist1800.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
61 Dodds, supra note 57, at 10.
62 Id.
63 Coolidge, supra note 60, at 473.
64 Young, supra note 52, at 7.
65 Id.; see also Dodds, supra note 57, at 155.
66 Young, supra note 52, at 7.
67 Dodds, supra note 57, at 160.
68 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, to Philander Knox, U.S. Senator of
Pa. (Mar. 3, 1906), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
69 Letter from Philander Knox, U.S. Sec’y of State, to William Howard Taft, U.S. President
(Nov. 29, 1911), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12; Letter from William Howard Taft,
U.S. President, to Philander Knox, U.S. Sec’y of State (Nov. 29, 1911), in THE KNOX PAPERS,
supra note 12.
70 Dodds, supra note 57, at 160.
71 Letter from William Howard Taft, U.S. President, to Philander Knox, U.S. Sec’y of State
(Nov. 29, 1911), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
72 FRANK K. KELLY, THE FIGHT FOR THE WHITE HOUSE: THE STORY OF 1912 78 (1961)
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judicial review, which was increasingly being challenged by legal progressives.73 But
he also regularly supported meaningful progressive measures. As Attorney General, he
was best known for his work establishing effective federal power over monopolies.74
As Senator, he ultimately supported two iconic pieces of progressive legislation: the
Hepburn Act,75 which gave the federal government for the first time the power to set
railroad rates, and the Pure Food and Drug Act.76 He was also the lead sponsor of the
second Federal Employers’ Liability Act,77 which made it easier for employees injured
in interstate commerce to recover in tort.78 He was even considered the labor candidate
in his fight for his party’s presidential nomination in 1908.79
Knox provides insight into the origins of the harmless items limit not just because
of his legal skills and mainstream political and constitutional views, but also because,
as Parts V and VI discuss in more detail, he played a decisive role in establishing both
the federal police power and the harmless items limit. As Attorney General, he sup-
ported the government’s attempts to establish a federal police power when he over-
saw the litigation in Champion v. Ames. He then used the result of that litigation to
support his central policy concern: extending federal control over the large interstate
businesses then known as trusts. As a Senator, Knox also helped defend the federal
police power from challenges, including his support of the Pure Food and Drug Act
and the Federal Employers Liability Act.80
Knox played an equally important role in establishing the harmless items limit.
Parts V and VI discuss in more detail how Knox, as both Attorney General and Senator
from Pennsylvania, clearly recognized important limits to the reach of the federal police
power and explicitly identified and defended the harmless items limit both in writing
and in legislative debates. The most noteworthy example was his widely noticed article
in the Yale Law Journal in 1908.81
Knox also provides a useful window into the forces that led to the emergence of
the harmless items limit because, unlike the Justices who voted in Hammer, he left
(noting his support for Taft as Knox described Roosevelt and his Bull Moose campaign as
driven by “imperious, ambitious vanities and mysterious antipathies”).
73 See 40 CONG. REC. 6440, 6496–97, 6503 (1906) (recording Knox’s arguments pushing
back against opposition to the Hepburn Act).
74 See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
75 40 CONG. REC. 7088 (1906) (recording Knox’s “yea” vote for the Hepburn Act).
76 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); 40 CONG.
REC. 2773 (1906) (recording Knox’s “yea” vote for the Pure Food and Drug Act).
77 Employers’ Liability (Federal Employers’ Liability) Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908).
78 See 42 CONG. REC. 499 (1908) (noting Knox’s introduction of Senate Bill 3080 “relating
to liability of common carriers engaged in commerce”); 40 CONG. REC. 2762, 6440, 6496–97,
6503 (1906) (marking instances of Knox’s support for the Hepburn Act and Pure Food and
Drug Act).
79 Dodds, supra note 57, at 155.
80 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81 Knox, supra note 15.
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behind substantial direct evidence of his views on both economic policy and federal-
ism as well as a clear record of consistent support for the federal police power and the
harmless items limit.82 In contrast, only one Supreme Court Justice voted in each of the
four important federal police power cases—Champion, Hipolite, Hoke, and Hammer—
Chief Justice Edward White.83 White voted with the majority each time, indicating he
too supported the federal police power and the harmless items limit, but he wrote none
of the opinions and his views on economic policy in the early twentieth century are
more difficult to ascertain than Knox’s.84
III. THE HARMLESS ITEMS LIMIT BEFORE HAMMER V. DAGENHART
Given Knox’s legal abilities and intimate knowledge of the federal police power,
his rejection of the conventional account is significant. And Knox clearly would have
rejected such claims. As this part establishes, he endorsed the harmless items limit,
publicly and elaborately, more than a decade before Hammer was decided. He did so
in a variety of fora, including legislative debates, private writings, and public speeches
that later parts detail. This part focuses on his most systematic defense of the doctrine
in the Yale Law Journal in 1908. This part also establishes that Knox was not alone
in recognizing the harmless items limit. A variety of politicians and legal scholars
accepted the rule in legal writings and public debates in the decade before Hammer
was decided.
A. Knox Supported the Harmless Items Limit in 1907
Knox discussed limits to Congress’s power to prohibit the interstate shipment of
goods in a variety of settings, but in 1908, in the Yale Law Journal, he explained his
support systematically.85 He argued for what he saw as a moderate position on the reach
of Congress’s commerce power. According to Knox, Congress could use its power to
regulate commerce to prohibit the interstate movement of goods. But he believed there
were important limits to that power. Congress could, he argued, prohibit the interstate
shipment of any goods—harmful or not—if it did so in order to protect or promote in-
terstate commerce.86 It could also prevent the channels of interstate commerce from
being used as a conduit for harmful goods, which meant that it could prohibit goods
82 See id.
83 See WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE
1910–1921 33, 93, 202–03 (1999). See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Hoke
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911);
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
84 Id.
85 See Knox, supra note 15. The article began as a graduation speech to the Yale Law
School in 1907. Senator Philander Knox, The Development of the Federal Power to Regulate
Commerce: Address of Senator Philander C. Knox to the Graduating Class of the Law School
of Yale University (June 24, 1907), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
86  See, e.g., Knox, supra note 15, at 146, 148.
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recognized as harmful. What Congress could not do, Knox contended, was prohibit
the interstate shipment of intrinsically harmless goods for purposes other than protect-
ing or promoting interstate commerce.87 Knox, in other words, argued for the very rule
the Supreme Court adopted in Hammer v. Dagenhart a full decade before that decision
was issued.
Knox began his argument from a traditional place: Chief Justice Marshall’s defi-
nition of the power to regulate commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden88 as “[t]he power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”89 Congress could thus reg-
ulate interstate commerce itself—the activities and intercourse which constitute the
commercial relationship—as well as the instrumentalities and channels of interstate
commerce.90 He also recognized that Congress’s commerce power was “plenary.”91
But he was emphatic that the Commerce Clause was a judicially enforceable limit
on the ends Congress could pursue, rather than the grant of a means Congress could
use to pursue other ends.92 “Congress,” he wrote:
may employ such means as it chooses to accomplish that which
is within its power. But the end to be accomplished must be within
the scope of its constitutional powers. The legislative discretion
extends to the means and not to the ends to be accomplished by
use of the means.93
He then spent much of his article identifying the categories of regulation that met
his requirement that Congress’s end be a regulation of commerce. Two categories were
uncontroversially constitutional: laws removing obstructions to interstate commerce—
including physical obstructions or obstructions resulting from the actions of States or
private parties—and laws that protected that commerce from injury. Both were uni-
formly understood as “regulations” of commerce.94
But he also contended that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce gave
it authority to prohibit commerce.95 Under Knox’s analysis, the clearest example of
Congress’s power to prohibit was a regulation that prohibited one type of interstate
commerce in order to protect or promote interstate commerce more broadly.96 A law
prohibiting the interstate shipment of nitroglycerine was constitutional because it
protected and promoted interstate commerce by keeping that commerce safe from
87 Id. at 146.
88 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
89 Id. at 143 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 144.
92 Id. at 148.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 144.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 146–47.
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destruction. For Knox, a law prohibiting the interstate shipment of a good made by a
monopoly abusing their market power would be constitutional under the same theory.
Such a regulation, he reasoned, properly protected and promoted interstate commerce
by prohibiting the movement of goods whose shipment was harming interstate com-
merce by choking off the interstate exchange of competing goods.97
Knox also endorsed the Court’s controversial decision in Champion v. Ames.98
In his view, laws that prohibited the interstate movement of diseased cattle or lottery
tickets also qualified as regulations of commerce. Such laws, he said, pursued the
end of regulating commerce because they “prevent[ed] the arteries of interstate com-
merce from being employed as conduits for articles hurtful to the public health,
safety or morals.”99
But his understanding that the Commerce Clause identified an end Congress could
pursue rather than a means it could use to pursue other ends led him to articulate mean-
ingful limits on that authority.100 It meant for him that Congress could only prohibit
interstate transportation of goods when that prohibition had “for its real object the
regulation of interstate commerce and not something dehors the Federal power.”101
Congress could not, according to Knox, “under the guise of a commercial regulation . . .
deny a person the right to engage in interstate commerce for doing that which Congress
cannot prohibit him from doing.”102 Congress, he did not need to point out, had no
general police power.
Knox thus did not argue that Congress could use its commerce power to prohibit
the interstate shipment of any goods whenever that prohibition would advance police
power ends. In a critical move, he identified the harmless items limit as a rule that dif-
ferentiated prohibitions that advanced police power ends that were regulations of inter-
state commerce and those that advanced police power ends but were regulations of
something else.103 “The power to regulate interstate commerce,” he declared, “does
not extend to the laying of an arbitrary embargo upon the lawfully produced, harmless
products of a State . . . .”104 Indeed, Knox argued that this limit—the same limit the
Court would adopt more than a decade later in Hammer—had already been recognized.
Congress’s “power of prohibition,” he pointed out, “has never been sustained except
as against articles noxious or dangerous in themselves.”105
97 Id. at 148.
98 Id. at 144, 147 (discussing Champion, 188 U.S. 321).
99 Id. at 144.
100 See, e.g., id. at 146, 148.
101 Id. at 148.
102 Id. at 146.
103 Though Knox did not directly mention the implications of this rule for a federal child
labor law, it was clearly in his mind. See Mr. Knox on the Federal Power, THE INDEP., July 4,
1907, at 46; Senator Knox at Yale, ZION’S HERALD, July 3, 1907, at 35.
104 Knox, supra note 15, at 146. Congress, he wrote, could not prohibit “the shipment from
[one] State of the innocuous products of producers who are pursuing a course sanctioned by the
laws of the State and in no wise in itself interfering with interstate commerce.” Id. at 146–47.
105 Id. at 147.
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Given the criticism Hammer has received, it is easy to see claims that the harmless
items limit can be derived from text of the Commerce Clause as the result of a trans-
parent conceptual error. This is certainly what Justice Holmes thought of the majority
opinion in Hammer when he flatly rejected the idea that only some prohibitions counted
as “regulations of commerce.” Holmes wrote:
It would not be argued today that the power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit. Regulation means the prohibition
of something, and when interstate commerce is the matter to be
regulated I cannot doubt that the regulation may prohibit any part
of such commerce that Congress sees fit to forbid.106
Holmes’s tidy package of linguistic consistency has proven so compelling to mod-
ern commentators that they have assumed any opposition was fueled by commitment
to a laissez-faire economy. Yet, it is clear that Knox, at least, was not intending to de-
rive the harmless items limit from the dictionary definition of the power to “regulate
interstate commerce.” And perhaps it was Holmes who—handicapped by the weakness
of Justice Day’s opinion—went too far by suggesting that any prohibition of interstate
commerce necessarily qualified as a regulation of interstate commerce for constitu-
tional purposes. Holmes’s suggestion certainly has the benefit of simplicity, but it has
implications that are quite broad indeed, and it is unnecessary to adopt it in order to
reject the harmless items limit.
Thomas Reed Powell, a political scientist who served on the faculty at the Harvard
Law School, was one of the harshest academic critics of the decision in Hammer, yet
even he rejected Holmes’s claim.107 To qualify as a regulation of interstate commerce,
he argued, it was not enough for a law to simply prohibit the interstate movement of
a good.108 Interstate commerce must contribute in some way to the harm Congress was
seeking to prevent.109 “No one,” he argued in the pages of the North Carolina Law
Review (giving Holmes the benefit of the doubt):
would have the hardihood to argue in favor of the constitutional-
ity of congressional prohibition of interstate transportation of all
goods from states in which divorce is allowed or of all persons
who beat their wives. Such interdictions of interstate transit would
browbeat the states not to permit divorce and browbeat husbands
not to browbeat their wives. They would wield the commerce
power as a club to control local enterprises in no way dependent
upon interstate commerce. Intra-marital pugilism would be dis-
suaded, not because belligerent husbands need interstate commerce
106 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277–78 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107 Powell, supra note 48, at 64–66.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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for the achievement of this particular aim, but because for other
reasons they are sufficiently eager for interstate wanderings to be
willing to comply with the independent and unrelated condition
which Congress selects as the criterion whether such wanderings
may take place. This would partake of the nature of brigandage
or blackmail.110
He thus rejected the suggestion of Holmes’s dissent that any prohibition of movement
in interstate commerce qualified as a “regulation of interstate commerce.”
But Powell nevertheless resolutely rejected the majority’s approach in Hammer.
The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act was a regulation of commerce not simply because
it prohibited the interstate shipment of a good, he argued, but because it prohibited the
interstate shipment of a good in order to address harms caused by interstate commerce.
The majority’s “crucial blunder,” he argued, was that it failed to recognize the nexus
between child labor and interstate commerce.111 The law was constitutional because
through its operation “the harmful results of child labor are forefended only to the
extent that interstate transportation is economically necessary to their fruition.”112
Once we see that despite Holmes’s epigrammatic assertion in Hammer there must
be some nexus between the harm Congress seeks to regulate and interstate commerce,
we can begin to make sense of Knox’s claim that Congress’s federal police power
allows it to prohibit the interstate shipment of only harmful goods. It was a formal doc-
trinal rule of the kind then common throughout the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence
that required a tight, rather than loose, connection between the means of prohibition
and the end of regulating interstate commerce.113
Knox’s harmless items limit was in that way similar to the same kind of means-
ends analysis now common in equal protection jurisprudence, requiring a kind of strict
or intermediate level scrutiny rather than rational basis review.114 If an article was itself
immoral, unhealthy, or unsafe, its shipment in interstate commerce would cause real
harm in the receiving state. Prohibiting its interstate shipment would thus prevent
a harm that was clearly caused by the item’s movement in interstate commerce. The
means of prohibition fit tightly with the end of regulating interstate commerce. If,
however, the article was itself intrinsically harmless, then to Knox, the fit seemed loose.
This looseness of fit suggested the law was, in fact, an attempt to use the commerce
110 Id. at 63.
111 Id. at 64.
112 Id.
113 For examples of such formalism within the Court’s jurisprudence, see Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (requiring an out of state corporation to be doing business in a state
for that state to assert personal jurisdiction) and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (limiting
regulation of prices to businesses affected with the public interest).
114 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (imposing the “most rigid scrutiny”
of racial classifications, which will be upheld only if they are “necessary to the accomplishment
of some permissible state objective”).
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power to regulate a subject reserved for state authority and ought to be struck down.
Knox and Powell, like others in the debate, disagreed not about whether “prohibition”
was “regulation” but about what rule should be used to determine when Congress was,
in fact, regulating commerce.
The harmless items rule Knox supported can be fairly criticized on the grounds
that it is formalistic and significantly under-inclusive. Often the shipment of even
harmless items in interstate commerce can cause significant harm. That is exactly what
Powell argued, as did other supporters of a broad federal police power.115 Without com-
petition for industry, states would be willing to pass stronger child labor laws; com-
petition for industry only occurred because there was a national market for the goods
made by children, and that national market depended on interstate commerce. The in-
terstate shipment of harmless goods made by children thus led to the harmful employ-
ment of children.116 Such harm may not be caused as “directly” as the harm caused by
the shipment of “intrinsically” harmful goods, but it is a harm created by interstate
commerce, nevertheless.
At bottom, that critique of the harmless items limit is a claim that the harmless
items line requires too tight a connection between interstate commerce and the harm
Congress seeks to regulate. But that means understanding Knox’s support for the
harmless items limit requires understanding why he thought that tight connection was
necessary, a task undertaken in Parts IV and V. Part IV argues that his support for the
rule was not derived from a laissez-faire economic philosophy. Part V argues that he
supported the harmless items limit because he hoped to allow Congress to address col-
lective action problems created by the increasing integration of the national economy
while protecting the well established constitutional values of free trade and freedom
of contract. Before turning to those issues, however, it is important to document that—
contrary to the conventional understanding of Hammer—Knox’s view of the harmless
items limit was, in fact, widely shared by opinion leaders of the day, including those
who supported significant regulations of the economy.
B. The Endorsement of Knox’s Theory
Knox was not alone in recognizing the harmless items limit in the years before
Hammer. His legal and political colleagues on both sides of the aisle agreed with his
analysis. Congressmen debating the extent of the federal police power regularly argued
that Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of harmful, but not harmless, arti-
cles of commerce.117 The debates over the Pure Food and Drug Act, which prohibited
the interstate shipment of impure food and drugs, are one example. Opponents of the
115 Powell, supra note 48, at 63–65.
116 See WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 21–42 (1970) (describing
the deplorable working conditions for children employed in the production of harmless goods,
such as coal, glass, and canned vegetables).
117 See, e.g., 40 CONG. REC. 8972 (1906).
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law argued it was an unconstitutional exercise of a general police power by the fed-
eral government.118 The response of the bill’s supporters was that Champion v. Ames
had established that Congress could use its power over interstate commerce to prohibit
the movement of harmful goods.119 Representative Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, for
example, admitted that Champion had not explicitly determined “whether Congress
might arbitrarily except from commerce among the States any article, however valu-
able and useful, which it might choose.”120 But it had clearly established that Congress
could prohibit the interstate shipment of harmful items, which was enough to support
the Pure Food and Drug Act.121
The same understanding was advanced during debates over child labor laws in
1907, 1914, and 1916.122 When Senator Albert Beveridge in 1907 argued Champion
allowed Congress to pass his child labor bill, which prohibited the interstate shipment
of goods produced by factories that employed children, multiple Senators protested.123
Champion, Senator John Spooner said, only allowed Congress to prohibit interstate
commerce in things that are deleterious to the people to whom they are shipped.124
Joining him was Senator Fulton:
I will ask [Senator Beveridge] if he does not observe that the lot-
tery case and the whisky case and all the cases cited have this
element in them: The exclusion of the articles amounts to a regu-
lation of commerce in that it withdraws from commerce things
that are deleterious to the people to whom they are shipped?125
The opponents of the Palmer-Owen and Keating-Owen child labor bills followed
the same line a decade later.126 “We contend,” said James Emery, counsel for the
National Association of Manufacturers, at a hearing on the constitutionality of the law:
that exclusion from commerce has never been applied nor contem-
plated by the Congress of the United States nor sustained by the
courts, with respect to any article that was not bad in itself, nor to
118 40 CONG. REC. 9099 (1906) (recounting Texas Senator Joseph Bailey’s argument that
the Senate Pure Food and Drug Bill “seems to assert in the Federal Government a police power
which I do not think exists”).
119 40 CONG. REC. 8972 (1906).
120 40 CONG. REC. 8973 (1906).
121 40 CONG. REC. 8975 (1906).
122 See 41 CONG. REC. 1872–75 (1907). See generally TRATTNER, supra note 116, at 119–42.
123 See 41 CONG. REC. 1867–81 (1907).
124 41 CONG. REC. 1872–75 (1907).
125 41 CONG. REC. 1872 (1907).
126 See, e.g., Argument in Opposition to the Form and Validity of H.R. 8234, Commonly
Known as the Keating Child Labor Bill: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 64th Cong. 40 (1916) (statement of James A. Emery, Counsel, National Association
of Manufacturers).
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any acts of individuals that did not threaten the safety or the free-
dom of that commerce.127
Governor Kitchin, hired by the southern cotton manufacturers, also sounded the
theme. “[A] lawful article of commerce can not be wholly excluded from importa-
tion into a State from another State in which it was manufactured or grown,” he said,
quoting the Supreme Court.128 “The bad article may be prohibited, but not the pure and
healthy one.”129 The rule, as he understood it, was that “the article must be of such
character as will do damage in the State in which it goes before the goods can be
barred.”130 The rule even surfaced in debates over the Mann Act,131 which prohibited
the interstate movement of women for immoral purposes.132 “My understanding,” said
an opponent of the bill, “is that the courts so far have held that Congress can prohibit
the transportation of commodities in interstate commerce only when there is some
inherent quality in the commodity which makes it dangerous to health or morals to
allow it to be transported.”133
In short, the distinction between harmful and harmless items that found expres-
sion in Hammer was not concocted by Justice Day and the other Justices who joined
his opinion to protect a laissez-faire economy they only belatedly realized was threat-
ened by the federal police power. It was, in fact, a concept with a pedigree that can be
traced back more than a decade to Knox’s article in the Yale Law Journal. And Knox,
as Part V reveals, was developing the idea even in 1903.
IV. THE HARMLESS ITEMS LIMIT AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
It is clear Knox and others supported the harmless items limit as early as 1907. It
is equally clear that Knox did not support a laissez-faire economic order. Knox’s private
papers and public acts demonstrate that by 1902 he had rejected the classical economic
ideas that justified a laissez-faire approach to regulation.134 He was instead a moderate
progressive committed to adjusting constitutional doctrine to the demands of a new
century while retaining the core constitutional values of the past. The following part
127 Id.
128 Interstate Commerce in Products of Child Labor: Hearing on H.R. 8234 Before the S.
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 64th Cong. 101 (1916) [hereinafter Hearing on Interstate
Commerce in Products of Child Labor] (statement of William Walton Kitchin, Governor of
N.C.) (citing Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 12 (1898)).
129 Id.; see also Schollenberger, 171 U.S. at 14.
130 Hearing on Interstate Commerce in Products of Child Labor, supra note 128, at 102
(statement of William Walton Kitchin, Governor of N.C.).
131 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2006)).
132 45 CONG. REC. 818 (1910).
133 Id.
134 See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
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explains that he supported some judicial limits on government regulation of the
economy, including doctrines that protected free trade among the states and freedom
of contract. But, as this part shows, he also believed technological and organizational
developments required additional federal regulation of the economy. By 1902, experi-
ence had convinced him that government needed to play an active role in ensuring that
monopolies did not destroy functioning markets. He had also become concerned with
problems created by the way the increasing integration of the national economy was
interacting with the limits the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
placed on the States.135 The collective action problems that interaction created—in
conjunction with his recognition of the government’s role in protecting a functioning
market—explain why he worked assiduously to expand Congress’s commerce power.
A. Laissez-Faire
“Laissez-faire,” can mean many things, but two ideas lay at its core. The first is
that the market is “natural”—that it existed prior to the creation of government and
continues to exist independent of government regulation. The second is that govern-
ment intervention in the market beyond protecting property and contract rights in-
evitably decreased liberty, which was both politically and economically undesirable.
Following Locke and Hobbes, laissez-faire supporters saw liberty as a good in itself
and opposed regulation on that ground.136 They also argued laissez-faire was prefer-
able on economic grounds: the “natural” market unencumbered by government regu-
lation was believed to maximize aggregate welfare by allowing individuals to choose
the most productive trades.137 Knox did have policy preferences that supported some
limits to government regulation of the economy: he believed freedom of contract was
an important constitutional right, opposed boycotts and other coordinated action by
labor unions, and valued free trade and a competitive market economy. But he saw a
much larger role for government regulation than a laissez-faire label suggests.
B. Knox’s Private Rejection of Laissez-Faire
Knox’s rejection of a laissez-faire system and embrace of a moderate progressiv-
ism is manifest in his private papers. Before the turn of the twentieth century, Knox
largely accepted laissez-faire principles. His Presidential address to the Pennsylvania
Bar Association critiqued proposed antitrust legislation in Pennsylvania by combining
support of free trade and freedom of contract with laissez-faire assumptions of a nat-
ural market and the benefits of private economic ordering.138 The law, Knox argued,
135 See infra notes 138–51 and accompanying text.
136 BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 29 (1998).
137 Id.
138 Philander C. Knox, President, Pa. Bar Ass’n, Address to the Members of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association: The Law of Labor and Trade 1–24 (June 30, 1897), in THE KNOX PAPERS,
supra note 12.
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undercut the freedom of contract he saw as the foundation of free governments.139
“Segregated competition in business is not a plank in our platform of rights, but the
liberty of contract,” he said, “is a main one. It is not nearly so important to foster a
fanciful system of free trade in a state as to rear a race of free men.”140 This perspective
grew in part from his belief that the rights of property and contract preceded govern-
ment. “The right to labor for the production of property,” he claimed, was “a necessary
consequence of the right to live.”141 The right to property was “the first concession
by tyranny to progressing humanity” and was “equally invaded by obstructing the
free employment of the means of production as by violently depriving the proprietor
of the product.”142 The right to exchange or sell property was “equally fundamental”
and “one of the inalienable rights of the citizen.”143 “We approach . . . legislation affect-
ing the rights to acquire, possess and protect property,” he said, “with the certainty that
by the fundamental law they are inherent and indefeasible in all men.”144
His speech then portrayed government interference with any of these rights as
harmful and short-sighted. Like mid-nineteenth-century Jacksonians, he opposed mo-
nopolies but believed they were created only when government granted an exclusive
privilege to private parties. Monopolies were “odious”145 but they could “only exist by
grant from the sovereign.”146 He simply ignored the possibility that private businesses—
even the enormous corporations like the Carnegie Steel Corporation that Knox had
represented—could abuse their market power to create the functional equivalent of
a government-created monopoly. “Two or more persons, whether natural or artificial,”
he wrote, “combining their labor, skill or capital in the prosecution of any work or
trade, cannot create a monopoly no matter what the terms of their combination may
be.”147 Laws against monopolies, he argued, were “meaningless, confusing and un-
necessary.”148 All that was needed was the refusal of the state to grant special privi-
leges, which was the real evil.
Additional antitrust legislation, he argued further, was not only unnecessary, it
would interfere with market processes and thus ultimately cause harm.149 “What is to
become of trade,” he wrote, “if methods cannot be changed to meet its ever varying
laws?”150 Existing law was sufficient, and had allowed competitive forces to generate
139 Id. at 1–3.
140 Id. at 22.
141 Id. at 2.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 3.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 8.
146 Id. at 9 (citing the definition of monopoly from Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. 420 (1837)).
147 Id. at 12.
148 Id. at 13.
149 Id. at 12–13.
150 Id. at 24.
90 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:67
great advances that should be celebrated, not stopped. “If it is true,” he said, “as al-
leged upon the one hand that there never was a time when the business of the country
was so concentrated, it is claimed to be also true upon the other hand that the public
has never been so well and cheaply served.”151
By the early twentieth century, however, Knox had developed a very different
understanding of the role of government, the need for regulation, and the impact of
the large, interstate businesses then known as trusts.152 He never rejected his belief in
the importance of free trade or freedom of contract, but he did conclude that govern-
ment regulation was necessary to create well functioning markets that would serve the
interests of all.
That transition is clear from a summary he wrote of Benjamin Kidd’s Principles
of Western Civilisation, published in 1902.153 That summary demonstrates how Knox
used the pre-historicist and teleological assumptions of Social Darwinism not to sup-
port laissez-faire economic theory, but to undermine it.154 In those notes, he accepted
that the law of survival of the fittest was “as valid and inexorable among social phe-
nomena and forces as in any other field of biology.”155 Competition produced prog-
ress in nature and in society and that iron law of development was largely beyond the
control of mankind. Its consequences could be resisted but ultimately not avoided.156
Kidd’s work, however, led Knox to recognize that government regulation created
properly functioning markets and to conclude that additional regulation of the American
economy was necessary. Kidd convinced Knox to view evolutionary pressures as act-
ing on groups, not just individuals. Knox accepted Kidd’s teleological claim that evolu-
tionary pressures driving social development would ensure that the “social tendencies”
that survived would be those that would be most helpful for future generations.157 What
that insight meant for Knox was that altruism and cooperation were not ethical consid-
erations unrelated to the survival of the fittest but were tools in the fight for survival.
One group might develop effective institutions that would increase social efficiency,
which would in turn give them a competitive advantage over other groups. The inex-
orable pressure of competition therefore actually encouraged cooperation, which was,
to Knox, a “more enlightened reading of the maxim, ‘the greatest good to the greatest
number,’ than that contained in the utilitarian doctrines of enlightened selfishness and
laissez faire.”158
151 Id.
152 See infra notes 153–66 and accompanying text.
153 BENJAMIN KIDD, PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN CIVILISATION (1902); Memorandum of
Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen., Comment on “underlying laws” (in all social and in-
dustrial movements) as suggested by Kidd’s Principles of Western Civilisation (1902), in
THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
154 See Knox, supra note 153.
155 Id. at 1.
156 He discusses the “laws which are irresistibly carrying forward the advancing peoples
of the world,” and the “immutable and irresistible laws” of development. Id. at 3–4.
157 Id. at 1–2.
158 Id. at 2.
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Applying these ideas to economic policy led Knox directly away from his earlier
laissez-faire opposition to government regulation. The error, he wrote, of the “great
modern economists” was that they had understood social advancement to require not
just competition but “uncontrolled competition.”159 Drawing support from what he
understood as the political theory of the Constitution, Knox argued that “uncontrolled
competition like unregulated liberty is not really free.”160 That meant that in both demo-
cratic governance and economic policy “there must be freedom secured by control and
regulation.”161 It meant that “the right method requires control of those factors tend-
ing to become immoderate through unregulated liberty, and calls for just restraint upon
the excesses of freedom which are themselves, in truth, unjust restraints in the interest
of a few.”162 What was needed was “regulation and control in the interest of all and for
the future.”163
To be clear, Knox’s critique of laissez-faire economic policy was not radical. He
did not, for example, join Robert Hale or others in undermining support for freedom
of contract.164 Nor was he willing to argue that property rights were in fact the creation
of government, as some critics did.165 He continued to believe a competitive market
economy was the best pathway to wealth and justice. And he remained concerned
about the power of labor unions. He rejected the “wage-fund” theory of classical
economics, which had been used to justify limiting wages for workers, and supported
the right to strike, but to him, boycotts interfered with the market for labor in the same
harmful ways that monopolies interfered with the market for goods.166 Yet despite
these limits, Knox had clearly rejected the central tenants of laissez-faire by the early
twentieth century. By then, he had come to believe that functioning markets required
effective government regulation and that the American economy needed additional
government oversight. And, as Part V establishes, he came to these conclusions at the
same time he was developing the harmless items limit to the federal police power.
C. Knox’s Public Rejection of Laissez-Faire
These ideas that Knox expressed in private were consistent with the policies he
pursued in public as both Theodore Roosevelt’s Attorney General from 1901 until
1904 and as Senator from Pennsylvania from 1904 until 1909, when he turned his
attention from domestic affairs and accepted appointment as Secretary of State. As
Senator and Attorney General, Knox not only consistently supported the harmless
159 Id. at 3.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 5.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 3.
164 See FRIED, supra note 136, at 16–18 (explaining Hale’s belief that coercion prevented
true freedom of contract even when the government did not interfere with contracts).
165 See id. at 19 (describing Hale’s position that government created property rights).
166 Knox, supra note 153, at 4.
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items limit to Congress’s commerce power but also consistently fought to extend
federal regulation of the economy. Though he never abandoned his concerns with
ensuring some limits on federal power, he supported far too wide a variety of federal
economic regulation to be considered a supporter of laissez-faire.
As Attorney General, Knox spearheaded the central policy priority of Theodore
Roosevelt’s first term: the fight to extend federal regulatory power over the large,
interstate businesses then commonly called trusts. “In 1902, his [Justice Department]
filed a series of antitrust suits against the ‘grain trust,’ the ‘cotton trust,’ the ‘beef trust,’
and, in what became perhaps the most watched case of the entire Progressive Era,
the Northern Securities Company of E. H. Harriman and J. P. Morgan.”167 Northern
Securities was an enormous victory for the government, and one that would not have
happened without Knox. Roosevelt recounted that Knox insisted that the govern-
ment could win the suit and Knox was active in the litigation until the end, actually
arguing the case before the Supreme Court.168
Knox also helped Roosevelt push a series of economic regulations through
Congress. His efforts led to the creation of the Bureau of Corporations—which was
empowered to examine and publicize pernicious corporate activity—and the passage
of the Elkins Act169—which limited the practice of railroad rebating—and bills that
eased procedural difficulties with antitrust prosecutions.170 Knox was so closely in-
volved with preparing and defending each of these initiatives that they were popularly
known as the “Knox Bills.”171 Illustrative of his commitment to regulation of the econ-
omy was a proposal among the Knox Bills to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods
produced by businesses who took advantage of their monopoly status.172 That idea
167 Logan E. Sawyer, III, Federalism and Reform: Party Politics and Constitutional Argument
in the Progressive Era Fight for Federal Child Labor Reform 67 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author). See also id. at 67–68 n.40 (“The
first challenged a practical monopoly on the purchase of grain from Midwestern farmers cre-
ated by railroads giving preferential rates to some grain dealers who paid the railroads for the
privilege then used it to drive other dealers from business. The second challenged pooling
agreements among railroads to distribute among themselves shipments from Southern cotton
producers. The case against the Beef Trust alleged that the large Chicago meat packers had col-
luded to set prices for the purchase of cattle and the sale of dressed beef. It was a significant
case because the meat packers operated officially only within the state of Illinois. The Northern
Securities Case was among the most watched of the entire Progressive Era. The suit alleged
that the Northern Securities Company, a holding company, was formed to illegally eliminate
competition among competing railroad lines.” (citation omitted)).
168 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 444 (1913); A Great Legal Triumph,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1903, at 6.
169 Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903).
170 LEWIS L. GOULD, REFORM AND REGULATION 36 (1996).
171 Anti-Trust Legislation: Senators Confident That Some Measure Will Be Passed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1903, at 8.
172 GEORGE F. HOAR, REPLY OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL DATED JANUARY 3, 1903, S.
DOC. NO. 57-73, at 19 (1903).
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was, as Part V discusses, one especially associated with Knox, but it was never passed
by Congress.
Knox left the Roosevelt administration in 1904 to become the junior Senator from
Pennsylvania, and in that role he again supported significant expansions of federal
authority over the economy. To be sure, Knox was unwilling to go as far as the most
progressive wing of the Republican Party. For example, he declined to support Senator
Beveridge’s federal child labor law in 1907,173 supported more aggressive judicial re-
view of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s authority to set railroad rates in 1906,174
and continued to support William Howard Taft for President rather than join Theodore
Roosevelt’s progressive “Bull Moose” Party in 1912.175 He nevertheless supported
some of the most important expansions of federal power over the national economy
while in the Senate. He ultimately supported the Hepburn Act.176 He voted for the Pure
Food and Drug Act in 1906 and helped defend its constitutionality from attack on the
floor of the Senate.177 He supported the first Federal Employers Liability Act178 and then
took the lead in the Senate in passing the second version of that bill, which used the
federal power to regulate interstate commerce to make it easier for injured workingmen
to win tort suits for on the job injuries.179
In sum, the progenitor of Hammer’s harmless items limit was far from an apologist
for a laissez-faire economy. His record, in fact, indicates that he had rejected laissez-
faire in both theory and practice, in both public and private, which suggests the harm-
less items limit itself reflected a much more moderate understanding of the role of the
federal government’s commerce power.
V. FEDERALISM, FREE TRADE, AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
If it was not a commitment to a laissez-faire economic order that generated the
harmless items limit, then what did? This part contends that Knox created, propagated,
and defended both the federal police power and the harmless items limit, because to-
gether they appeared to him the best way to allow the federal government to solve
problems created by the increasing integration of the national economy while simul-
taneously protecting the values of federalism, free trade, and freedom of contract.
173 See 41 CONG. REC. 1825, 1878–79 (1907) (recording Knox’s arguments against
Beveridge’s bill).
174 ROBERT HARRISON, CONGRESS, PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AND THE NEW AMERICAN
STATE 64 (2004) (detailing Knox’s introduction of an amendment to the Hepburn bill to
allow for greater judicial review by the Interstate Commerce Commission).
175 See KELLY, supra note 72, at 72.
176 40 CONG. REC. 6440, 6496–97, 6503 (1906).
177 See SAWYER, supra note 167, at 140.
178 Id. at 274.
179 42 CONG. REC. 499 (1908) (noting Knox’s introduction of Senate Bill 3080 “relating to
liability of common carriers engaged in commerce”).
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As Part V.A explains, Knox supported the federal police power because he believed
Congress needed to be able to address the collective action problems that resulted from
the increasing integration of the national economy. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, national railroad networks and the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine created a unified national economy. American politics and governance,
on the other hand, remained largely local, with the states responsible for most eco-
nomic regulation. The result was that states competed to attract and retain businesses
with lax regulation, something many, including Knox, believed led to poor regula-
tory outcomes.180 In the courts and in Congress, Knox fought to address this problem
by arguing Congress could constitutionally prohibit the interstate shipment of goods,
either to protect interstate trade or to advance police power ends.181
But, as the remainder of this part argues, his concern with solving collective action
problems among the States had to be balanced with other concerns and integrated into
existing constitutional doctrine. Ultimately, the approach he adopted and then defended
was what he described systematically in his article in the Yale Law Journal: Congress
could prohibit the interstate shipment of any goods—harmful or harmless—when it
was protecting or promoting commerce, but when it was exercising the “federal police
power,” it could prohibit only the interstate shipment of harmful goods.182
To modern eyes, support of the harmless items limit can seem unreasonable. Most
notably, as Part II indicated, allowing Congress to prohibit the interstate shipment of
only harmful items is a formal rule that can seem woefully under-inclusive if the goal
is solving collective action problems. Parts V.B, V.C, and V.D seek to explain why
Knox supported the harmless items limit despite this under-inclusiveness. Together
they recover a set of crucial assumptions Knox and many of his contemporaries made
about law and government that are too often misunderstood or forgotten. It is those as-
sumptions that explain why Knox and many others supported the harmless items limit.
Part V.B explains how Knox’s concern that Congress could pose a real threat to
free trade among the states led him to support the harmless items limit. Part V.C estab-
lishes that Knox supported freedom of contract and then explains why he reasonably
believed that the harmless items limit was necessary to prevent Congress from using its
commerce power to make an end run around the restrictions imposed by freedom of
contract doctrine. Part V.D then discusses how the harmless items limit was supported
by the high value many progressives like Knox placed on meaningful local politics and
180 Graebner, supra note 4, at 332 (“Key business groups, largely from highly competitive
industries with interstate markets, opposed most state social legislation on the grounds that it
would place their firms at a competitive disadvantage in relationship to firms operating in states
with less advanced, and therefore less costly, programs.”); David A. Moss, Kindling a Flame
Under Federalism: Progressive Reformers, Corporate Elites, and the Phosphorus Match
Campaign of 1909–1912, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 244, 244 (1994) (“No state wanted to be the
first to act (for fear of driving industry from its borders)”).
181 See SAWYER, supra note 167, at 82.
182 Knox, supra note 15, at 148.
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their sanguine expectation that many collective action problems could be addressed
by interstate cooperation. These assumptions are contestable, and few would adopt
them today. But recovering them is necessary to understand why Knox and others
supported the harmless items limit.
A. The Problems of an Integrated National Economy
A central problem in the political economy of the United States in the early twen-
tieth century was the growing disconnect between an increasingly integrated national
economy and a localistic political system.183 As the railroads, the telegraph, and other
technological innovations increasingly integrated the national economy, regulatory
decisions made in one state had increasingly important effects in other states. At the
same time, the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prevented the
states from effectively grappling with the problem.
In the late nineteenth century, the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions were almost
exclusively concerned not with the reach of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause, but with the limits the Commerce Clause placed on state authority. The central
concern of those cases was to turn the nation into a “free-trade zone” by ensuring that
state laws did not interfere with interstate trade.184 “[T]he Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,” Professor Barry Cushman has explained, “was driven by frankly
instrumental impulses: to secure a national market for the products of an increasingly
vibrant and integrated economy, while at the same time preserving state and local pre-
rogatives to regulate business in an era of comparative federal lassitude.”185 Justice
Bradley’s opinion in Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County,186 for example,
struck down a tax on traveling salesmen on the grounds that it protected local dealers
from out-of-state competition.187 Allowing a state to “impose restrictions upon interstate
commerce for the benefit and protection of its own citizens [would bring the nation]
back to the condition of things which existed before the adoption of the Constitution,
and which was one of the principal causes that led to it.”188 Justice Matthews explained
183 Graebner, supra note 4, at 331–32.
184 See 8 OWEN FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 257–59
(1993) (examining early twentieth-century Supreme Court attempts to allocate power between
state and federal governments); Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1101–26 (2000) (arguing that formalism was in part
an attempt to promote free trade on a national level and maintain states’ ability to regulate);
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation,
1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 632 (1978) (describing the emergence in the late nineteenth
century of an American “free trade” doctrine).
185 Cushman, supra note 184, at 1126.
186 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
187 Id. at 497–98.
188 Id. at 498.
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the reason the Court struck down an Iowa law that effectively prohibited the impor-
tation of liquor this way:
If the State of Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicating
liquors from all other States, it may also include tobacco, or any
other article, the use or abuse of which it may deem deleterious. . . .
It may choose to establish a system directed to the promotion and
benefit of its own agriculture, manufactures or arts of any descrip-
tion . . . . In view of the commercial anarchy and confusion that
would result from the diverse exertions of power by the several
States of the Union, it cannot be supposed that the Constitution or
Congress have intended to limit the freedom of commercial inter-
course among the people of the several States.189
To accomplish its goal of protecting an integrated national market, the Court in-
validated a significant number of what had been long established state tax and regu-
latory laws. It did so when those laws were acknowledged to be otherwise legitimate
exercises of a state’s police power. Minnesota v. Barber190 is a clear example: the deci-
sion struck down a state law that required the preslaughter inspection of beef because
the law “by its necessary operation . . . directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of
animals . . . to those engaged in such business in [the] State.”191 The Court pursued
this goal even when those barriers to interstate trade did not discriminate against out
of state goods.192 States, for example, were denied authority to exclude liquor193 and
oleomargarine194 from their borders, two items that were regarded by many as harmful
to health and whose manufacture and sale were prohibited by states.
Given the efficiency of interstate trade networks created by the telegraph and the
railroad, these decisions made it impossible for states to prohibit their citizens from
obtaining items the state believed harmful. An excellent example is the “original pack-
age saloons” that sprung up in dry states in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
189 Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 494 (1888).
190 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
191 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890); see generally McCurdy, supra note
184, at 645–48 (discussing Barber, 136 U.S. 313).
192 See Cushman, supra note 184, at 1101–26.
193 See generally Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100
(1890); Bowman, 125 U.S. at 465.
194 See generally Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30 (1898); Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898). Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 461–62 (1894),
in contrast, allowed a state to prohibit the importation of oleomargarine colored to look like
butter and distinguished it from Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, on the grounds that this state
law was intended to prohibit fraud. It was a distinction commentators found unpersuasive.
See JAMES PARKER HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301 (1917).
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in Leisy v. Hardin.195 That decision held that states could not prohibit the interstate
importation or sale of a legitimate article of commerce like liquor that remained in its
“original package.”196 While it remained in such a package, it remained within the
domain of interstate commerce and thus beyond the reach of the state police powers.197
Saloon owners took advantage by selling individual patrons packages of liquor and
state lacked the authority to stop them. Though states attempted to regulate items they
considered harmful like alcohol, despite these challenges, many reformers recognized
that these rules not only interfered directly with the attempts of states to protect their
citizens, they also discouraged states from trying to pass such regulations in the first
place. At different times, reformers blamed the difficulties of effectively regulating
child labor, meat products and other food, phosphorus matches, mine safety, even
corporations, on the difficulties created by collective action problems created by the
federal system.198
These problems could be addressed in many different ways. Reconfiguring the
Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to allow states more power
to protect their own citizens was one approach. That was the focus of the campaign
against alcoholic beverages.199 But Knox largely rejected that approach, because, as dis-
cussed below, he was committed to free trade among the states.200 He instead dedicated
his energies to finding ways to empower the federal government to address the problem.
1. Antitrust, Degenerative Competition, and the Prohibition of Interstate Commerce
Knox’s fight against the trusts exemplifies his approach. In the early twentieth
century, states had ample formal authority to corral the trusts. At that time, most trusts
had taken advantage of New Jersey’s lax corporation laws to organize themselves as
195 See, e.g., Original Package Saloons, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, May 14, 1890, at 1.
196 Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124–25.
197 Id.
198 Moss, supra note 180, at 247 n.5 (explaining the problem among states at the turn of
the twentieth century of “degenerative competition,” a term Moss uses to refer to “legislative
laxity at the state level resulting from economic competition among the various states”); see
also WILLIAM GRAEBNER, COAL-MINING SAFETY IN THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD 113 (1976)
(illustrating the challenge of regulating mine safety in the face of collective action issues);
Graebner, supra note 4, at 331–32 (describing the difficulty in regulating in light of economic
competition and reformers’ acceptance of that reality at the time); David Brian Robertson, The
Bias of American Federalism: The Limits of Welfare-State Development in the Progressive
Era, 1 J. POL’Y HIST. 261, 261 (1989) (“Faced with well-known resource disparities among
the states [and] perceived ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ economic development strategies . . . state
policymakers felt enormous pressure to maintain an attractive ‘business climate’ characterized
by . . . limited social expenditure.”).
199 See FISS, supra note 184, at 262–65. See generally RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE
EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT (1995).
200 See infra notes 258–64.
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New Jersey holding companies.201 The New Jersey parent corporation would own
subsidiary corporations in other states that in turn owned the production facilities
or natural resources necessary to the businesses’ operation. States could prohibit the
operation of trusts organized that way by using a variety of tools. They could, for
example, bring quo warranto suits to dissolve a domestic corporation on the grounds
that it had violated its state law by alienating control of the corporation to the New
Jersey holding company. It could then use its authority to prohibit foreign corporations
from operating within its limits to ensure that the New Jersey company itself would
not purchase the assets within the state.202
When used, these tools were successful. Quo warranto suits succeeded in dis-
solving the in-state arms of the Cottonseed Oil Trust in Louisiana, the Sugar Trust in
New York and California, the Whiskey Trust in Illinois and Nebraska, and the Standard
Oil Trust in Ohio.203 The same approach could have been just as effective in the early
twentieth century.
What states could not do, however, was ensure that someone else would step in
to purchase and run the factories after the trust’s investment was removed. Because
trusts arose in response to a nationwide excess of productive capacity, it was possible
no one would step in to replace the trust’s investment in the state after a successful quo
warranto suit. Thus, if other states failed to follow suit, the only thing the state would
win for its trouble would be the shuttering of factories in its jurisdiction and a boom to
the trust owned factories in nearby states, which could, under the Supreme Court’s
Dormant Commerce Clause, ship products into the state. This created a clear reason
for the states to decline to address the trust problem.
Knox’s private papers make clear that he believed increased federal power was
needed to solve this problem.204 Pushing him towards that conclusion were the problems
created by the massive strikes in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal mines in 1902. The
bitter contest between mine owners and the United Mine Workers of America forced
President Roosevelt to intervene when a bargaining stalemate threatened to disrupt the
supply of coal to multiple major East Coast cities outside the state of Pennsylvania that
winter.205 Roosevelt’s involvement helped resolve the strike and to Knox it became an
example of the failure of state regulation to address national needs, even though the
issues raised by the strike were traditionally state law issues. “The need of Federal
control over interstate transportation and trade in articles produced under conditions
201 Dante J. Scala, Taxing the Intangibles: How States Pursued Corporate Wealth in the
Early Twentieth Century, 27 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 431, 432 (1998).
202 See generally Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and The
Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304 (1979)
(explaining the use of quo warranto suits and analyzing the Knight decision as an attempt
to maintain a measure of state control over state-chartered corporations).
203 Id. at 321–22.
204 See SAWYER, supra note 167, at 62–63.
205 See ANDREW ROY, A HISTORY OF THE COAL MINERS OF THE UNITED STATES 391–404
(1907); see also ROOSEVELT, supra note 168, at 465–67.
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of practical monopoly which exist in many States,” he wrote in a memorandum on
the issue, “is strikingly exemplified by the possible situation in Pennsylvania.”206
Pennsylvania’s monopoly laws—the same laws Knox opposed strengthening in 1897—
would allow the entire coal industry to come under the control of one person, no mat-
ter how “irresponsible, arbitrary or avaricious.”207 And labor, “as we have seen to our
cost for the last six months,” could not be counted on to bring “relief to the general
interests.”208 It was the federal government that ought to address such problems.209
Knox’s public acts reveal the same concern. He spent much of his time as Attorney
General trying to find a way to minimize the effects of the Supreme Court’s 1895 de-
cision in United States v. E.C. Knight Company.210 That decision had cast grave doubts
on the federal government’s ability to regulate the trusts effectively by striking down
the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to a business organization that controlled
ninety eight percent of the nation’s sugar refining capacity. Manufacturing, the Court
held, was not part of commerce and thus a manufacturing monopoly like the Sugar
Trust could not be regulated under Congress’s commerce power.211 Knox launched
a litigation campaign against the trusts that included the high profile suit against the
Northern Securities Company of E. H. Harriman and J. P. Morgan.212 In the same
period, he also launched a less known but, for the purposes of this paper, more im-
portant legislative campaign.
In 1902, Knox laid his “Knox Bills” before Congress.213 Among them was his
most aggressive idea: a proposal to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods pro-
duced by businesses that misused their market power.214 He introduced the proposal
in a widely publicized speech in Pittsburgh in October of 1902.215 E.C. Knight, Knox
206 Memorandum from Philander C. Knox, Memorandum Regarding Anthracite Coal Strike
(1902), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
211 Id. at 17.
212 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1903).
213 The other bills concerned the creation of the Bureau of Corporations—empowered to
examine and publicize pernicious corporate activity—the Elkins Act—which limited the prac-
tice of railroad rebating—and bills that eased procedural difficulties with antitrust prose-
cutions. GOULD, supra note 170, at 35–37. For a reference to the “Knox Bills,” see Anti-Trust
Legislation: Senators Confident That Some Measure Will Be Passed, supra note 171, at 8;
New Anti-Trust Bill: Senator Elkins Introduces Measure Embodying Knox Recommendations
as to Railways’ Rebates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1903, at 1.
214 Philander C. Knox, Attorney-General of the United States, Address Before the Chamber
of Commerce, Pittsburgh, PA (Oct. 14, 1902), in PHILANDER C. KNOX, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TRUSTS: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PHILANDER
C. KNOX, ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
PITTSBURGH, PA (OCT. 14, 1902) at 10–14, 18 (1902).
215 Id. at 1–42.
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argued, even if correctly decided, was a more limited holding than was generally
understood, because the Sherman Act was a more limited law than was commonly
supposed.216 The Act, he said, only prohibited “attempts to monopolize interstate
commerce[;]” it did not prohibit “monopolies of production” or seek “to free [inter-
state commerce] from the restraints such monopolies” of production create.217 Because
the Sherman Act did not attempt to free commerce from those indirect effects, E.C.
Knight, Knox argued, could not and “did not say that these indirect effects upon inter-
state commerce could not be prevented by Congress.”218 Congress, in other words, had
a power that it had not yet tried to exercise, and that power could be used to prohibit
the interstate shipment of goods produced by trusts that abused their market power.
The speech created a sensation. Theodore Roosevelt called it one of “the most
important” speeches given by any member of his administration.219 A leading conser-
vative Democratic newspaper called Knox’s plan “radical” and a “federal despotism.”220
Days later, the Chairmen of both the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees wrote
to Knox asking him for more information about his plan.221 The speech was reprinted
verbatim in two official Congressional publications,222 and it prompted the Senate to
ask him to propose specific additional antitrust legislation.223 Even five years later,
a Pennsylvania Congressman said its farsightedness demonstrated that Knox would
make an excellent President.224
Despite the attention, Knox lacked a Supreme Court decision that explicitly con-
firmed that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce allowed it to prohibit
interstate shipments of goods. To find the support he needed, he looked to Champion
v. Ames. Whether Knox’s Pittsburgh speech was influenced by the then-pending litiga-
tion in Champion, or whether the government’s arguments in Champion were shaped
by Knox’s antitrust proposals is difficult to determine. Most likely the influence was
216 Id. at 8, 10–12, 18.
217 Id. at 12 (stating Knox’s conclusion as to “how far [the Sherman Act] went and where
it stopped”).
218 Id.
219 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, to W.H. Keach (1902), in THE PAPERS
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (on file with the Library of Congress); see also James Burke,
Senator Knox and the Presidency, THE INDEP., Mar. 26, 1908, at 664.
220 Editorial, The Knox Anti-Trust Programme Tried and Condemned Thirty Years Ago,
N.Y. SUN, Jan. 18, 1903, at 8. Other papers were more supportive, including THE J. OF
INDUSTRY, June 22, 1903.
221 S. DOC. NO. 57-73, at 3 (1903); Letter from George F. Hoar, U.S. Sen. from Mass., to
Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 3, 1903), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12; Letter
from Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Charles E. Littlefield, U.S. Rep. from Me. (Jan. 6,
1903), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
222 S. DOC. NO. 57-73, at 37–50; 36 CONG. REC. 413–15 (1902).
223 S. DOC. NO. 57-73, at 3 (detailing the request made to Knox).
224 James Burke, U.S. Rep. from Pa., Speech of Hon. James Francis Burke Before the Pa.
Delegation in Cong. 1–2, 12–13, 15–16 (Dec. 4, 1907), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
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reciprocal; both Knox’s speech and the government’s third argument in Champion v.
Ames occurred in October of 1902.225 But Knox clearly saw them as serving related
purposes. When the House and Senate Judiciary Committees challenged the plans Knox
outlined in his Pittsburgh speech on the grounds that Congress lacked the power to pro-
hibit the interstate shipment of goods,226 Knox provided the committees with copies
of the government’s brief from Champion.227
Champion, in other words, was for Knox a weapon that could empower the federal
government to control the trusts. Ultimately, it was not enough. The rest of the Knox
Bills passed Congress, but his antitrust bill did not. Even so, Knox’s attempt to use
Champion to support his antitrust bill brings clearly into view his efforts to solve
collective action problems of the states by establishing that Congress could prohibit
the interstate shipment of goods in the proper circumstances. The broader point, too,
is clear. While the harmful items limit of Hammer is widely viewed as the invention
of Justices committed to a laissez-faire economy, it was actually generated by a lawyer
who was fighting to expand federal regulation of business in critical ways.
2. The Federal Police Power
Knox’s attempt to use Champion to pass far-reaching antitrust legislation is not
the only example of his efforts to address the states’ collective action problems. Knox
supported Champion not just because it bolstered the idea that Congress could prohibit
commerce in order to protect commerce, but also because it recognized that Congress’s
commerce power could be used to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from
being used as a conduit for items harmful to the health, morality, safety, or general
welfare of the nation. That is, Knox supported it because he supported a limited federal
police power.
Knox’s primary interest in Champion v. Ames may have stemmed from its potential
to support his antitrust bill, but he also supported its recognition that Congress could
exercise that prohibitory power to address other state collective action problems. In fact,
it may be that Knox pushed the Solicitor General to take a more aggressive position
on the constitutionality of the federal police power in the Champion litigation. And
it is certain that Knox helped convince Congress that it had such a power and that
it should exercise it.
From the start, Champion v. Ames was a case about state collective action prob-
lems. The central problem that all federal anti-lottery legislation sought to solve was
225 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 335–44 (1903); Knox, supra note 214.
226 36 CONG. REC. 415–16 (1902); Letter from George F. Hoar, U.S. Sen. from Mass., to
Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen., supra note 221.
227 Letter from Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen., to George F. Hoar, U.S. Sen. from
Mass. (Jan. 5, 1903), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12 (citing the Assistant Attorney
General’s brief for Champion as support for his position on Congress’s commerce power);
Letter from Philander C. Knox, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Charles E. Littlefield, U.S. Rep. from
Me., supra note 221.
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the states’ inability to prohibit their citizens from playing lotteries that took place in
other states. A law banning the shipment of lottery tickets in the mails was necessary,
proclaimed the relevant House Report, because the states were “helpless” against the
evils created by the largest lottery of the time—the Louisiana Lottery.228 They could not
stop mail trains from bringing advertisements, tickets, or winnings into the state. It
was thus the “duty of Congress” to prevent one state from using the mails to “violate
the laws” of the other.229 The Lottery Act of 1895230—which led to the litigation in
Champion v. Ames—aimed to prevent lottery companies from simply shifting their
business from the mail to private express companies whose interstate operations were
placed by the Dormant Commerce Clause beyond state regulatory authority.231
Each of the government’s briefs in Champion—including briefs written while
Knox was Attorney General—emphasized that the Lottery Act was necessary be-
cause the states could prevent lotteries based within their borders, but could not ad-
dress the evil of lottery tickets shipped in from out of state.232 The government argued
in its second brief:
[I]f this act be declared unconstitutional, and there be no power in Congress
to suppress interstate commerce in lotteries, then the demoralization of
these business enterprises can not be successfully combated. Is it possible
that the Federal Government is so impotent that when it sees the channels
of interstate commerce used as a means to strike down the police powers
of the State that it can not by auxiliary legislation [aid] the States in their
laudable purpose of suppressing this demoralizing business?233
This same concern was also highlighted in Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in
Champion. In upholding the law, Harlan emphasized that regulating lotteries was a
legitimate government end and that the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
prohibited states from stopping out-of-state lotteries. “We should hesitate long,” he
228 H.R. REP. NO. 50-787, at 2 (1888) (“Against this evil, condemned by public opinion
and by their laws, the States are helpless.”).
229 Id.
230 Anti-Lottery Act, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890).
231 27 CONG. REC. 3013 (1895) (setting forth the text of the bill and also capturing the
arguments made in support of its passage).
232 See Revised Brief for the United States on Third Oral Argument, Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1902) (containing a consolidation of the briefs).
233 Brief for Appellee at 31–32 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). The United States
has previously argued:
Such police power must exist somewhere as to interstate trade. It can not
be nonexistent. Obviously it does not exist in the States; therefore it must
exist in the Federal Government, and there is nothing in the legislative or
judicial history of the country that in any manner gainsays this conclusion.
Revised Brief for the United States on Third Oral Argument at 72, Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321 (1902) (No. 9).
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wrote, “before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on through
interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to that
end. We say competent to that end, because Congress alone has the power to occupy,
by legislation, the whole field of interstate commerce.”234
Knox seems to have supported the concept of a federal police power in Champion,
and he certainly did not oppose it. Indeed, the first formal reference in any briefs to
a federal police power came in the third brief, when Knox was firmly established as
Attorney General and focused on the issue of Congress’s ability to prohibit the inter-
state shipment of goods.235
But, regardless of how closely Knox engaged himself in the Champion litigation,
he surely worked to convince Congress that the approach was valid. Not only did he
begin the debate over Congress’s power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods
in the debates over his antitrust bill, he also voted and argued for the constitutionality
of the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA), an iconic piece of Progressive Era legislation
that later led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hipolite Egg.236 The PFDA was the
forerunner of the modern Food and Drug Administration, and its passage was famously
made possible by the publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle.237 The Act proposed
to prohibit the interstate shipment of food and drugs that had not been inspected and
approved by the federal government.238 Such inspections required federal inspectors
be allowed inside the factories that produced the food or drugs for export.239
Opponents of the bill argued that the inspection of food and drugs was a classic
example of the exercise of a police power and thus, under dual federalism, within the
sole authority of the state governments. In Congress, the chief proponent of that view
was Texas Senator Joseph Bailey. The PFDA, Bailey argued, was clearly unconsti-
tutional. It was understood by everyone to be an attempt to protect the people from
“deleterious articles of food and drink.”240 It was thus not a regulation of commerce.
It was “purely and only an exercise of the police power, and therefore not within the
power of the Federal Government.”241 The way to fix the problem, Bailey argued, was
234 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357–58 (1903). “The framers of the Constitution never
intended,” Harlan continued, quoting from In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891), “that the
legislative power of the Nation should find itself incapable of disposing of a subject matter
specifically committed to its charge.” Id. at 358.
235 See Revised Brief for the United States on Third Oral Argument at 72, Champion , 188
U.S. 321 (No. 9).
236 See 40 CONG. REC. 2773 (1906) (recording Knox’s “yea” vote for the Pure Food and
Drug Act).
237 See generally UPTON B. SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
238 Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 768–72 (1906).
239 See Harvard Law Review Association, Development in the Law—The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L. REV. 632, 686–87 (1954).
240 40 CONG. REC. 2758 (1906) (“[I]t is intended, understood, and supported for the purpose
of protecting the people of the several States against injurious articles of food and drink . . . .”).
241 Id.
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to recognize that the states could prohibit the importation of articles of commerce they
felt were harmful.242
Knox, as was his usual practice in such debates, answered Bailey with a pointed
and effective counter. “May I,” he said, “ask a question of the Senator from Texas?”243
He then drove straight to the weakness in Bailey’s case: the Champion decision. “I only
rise to ask the Senator if he has considered in . . . connection [with his argument] the
case of Champion against Ames?”244 The question alone was enough to put Bailey on
the defense. “[S]o far as the case is worth anything it tends to establish the doctrine of
a police power in the General Government,” Bailey admitted, and the best he could do
was to admit he disagreed with the Court.245 Later that day, the PFDA passed by a vote
of 63–4.246
3. Knox, Congress’s Prohibitory Power, and the Harmless Items Limit
Knox’s support for solving collective action problems caused by the increasing
integration of the national economy by empowering Congress to prohibit the interstate
shipment of goods might be understood to contradict his commitment to the harmless
items limit. His antitrust legislation explicitly prohibited the interstate shipment of
harmless goods, and his hope that Champion v. Ames would support that legislation
could imply that he believed that Champion recognized Congress’s authority to pro-
hibit the interstate shipment of any goods, not just harmful goods.247 But he explained
in his 1908 Yale Law Journal article how the harmless items limit to the federal police
power was consistent with his proposed antitrust legislation.248 He also clearly recog-
nized these limits much earlier.
Knox’s recognition of meaningful limits to Congress’s power to prohibit com-
merce found early expression in his response to a critique of his Pittsburgh speech in
242 Id. (“I insist that such legislation belongs to the States and not to the General Government,
because with the States is left the right to control and the power to control the health and morals
of their people.”).
243 Id. at 2762.
244 Id.
245 Id. Bailey, in expressing his disagreement with the Champion decision, remarked that
he “never refer[s] to [Champion]” if he could “avoid it.” Id.
246 40 CONG. REC. 2773 (1906).
247 See KNOX, supra note 214, at 1–42; supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 85–105. There he argued that Congress’s commerce power permitted it
to pursue the end of regulating commerce. Prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods pur-
sued such an end when the prohibition protected or promoted interstate commerce—as when
the law prohibited the interstate shipment of nitroglycerine. It also did so, as Knox argued in
Pittsburgh and again in the Yale Law Journal, when the shipment of trust-made goods was chok-
ing off trade from other participants. What was called a federal police power also pursued the end
of regulating commerce if Congress was prohibiting interstate trade in order to prevent interstate
commerce from being a conduit for harmful goods or transactions. See supra notes 85–105.
2012] CREATING HAMMER V. DAGENHART 105
the Harvard Law Review in 1903.249 Parmalee Prentice had already written a treatise on
the Commerce Clause, but his 1903 Harvard Law Review article focused on a specific
issue: he argued that the right to engage in interstate commerce arose from state law be-
fore the Constitution, and was not altered by the Commerce Clause.250 This conclusion,
he argued, was important because some had argued that the federal government’s com-
merce power allowed it to either grant or withhold the authority to participate in inter-
state commerce at its pleasure.251 The only person he identified as making this claim
was Philander Knox.252
But, even at that early date, Knox supported the end-based limit on congressional
power that he outlined systematically in the Yale Law Journal.253 In a memorandum
that seems aimed at Prentice’s critique, Knox denied the accusation. The charge, Knox
wrote, was “wholly incorrect. The distinction between the power to prohibit arbitrarily
and for the protection of commerce I have now pointed out, was [in my Pittsburgh
speech] clearly and emphatically noted.”254 He wrote:
There is a plain distinction between denying to the guiltless the un-
doubted right to engage in interstate commerce, without Federal
authority, which right existed prior to and independent of the
Constitution, and denying that right to [persons or] combination[s]
guilty of restraining or monopolizing such commerce.
The one proposition is that the right to engage in interstate
commerce cannot exist without the Government’s permission; the
other is that the right is denied to those who abuse its enjoyment by
disobeying a lawful government regulation against its restraint.255
Knox also made clear in early public statements that Champion v. Ames did not
address the question of whether Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of any
good if by doing so it would promote police power ends. In the same January 1903
submission to Congress that contained his antitrust proposal, Knox told Congress the
decision in Champion would determine a narrower issue: whether “the right to regulate
[interstate commerce] includes the right to prohibit where the character of the article
warrants its exclusion from commerce.”256
249 E. Parmalee Prentice, The Origin of the Right to Engage in Interstate Commerce, 17
HARV. L. REV. 20, 21 & n.1 (1903).
250 Id. (relying on Knox’s Pittsburgh speech to support his argument).
251 Id. (“If the right to engage in interstate commerce find its source only in federal law, . . .
the right may be one which the federal government may grant or withhold at pleasure.”).
252 Id.
253 Knox, supra note 15, at 139, 144–46.
254 Memorandum from Philander C. Knox, Comments on Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce
Speech 1 (1904), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
255 Id. at 3.
256 S. DOC. NO. 57-73, at 11 (1903).
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Knox, in short, was consistent in articulating limits to Congress’s commerce power
that reflected the rule adopted by the Court in Hammer, but he did so at the same time
he was fighting to establish that there were situations in which Congress could consti-
tutionally use its commerce power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods and was
urging Congress to use that power to regulate business. When combined with the evi-
dence from Knox’s private papers that rejected the central ideas of laissez-faire eco-
nomics, it is inconceivable that Knox’s support of the harmless items limit was driven
by a simple desire to protect business from government regulation. His support for the
harmless items limit had its sources elsewhere, which the next three Parts identify.
B. Free Trade in the Early Twentieth Century
Knox supported the harmless items limit not because it advanced a laissez-faire
agenda, but because it would, he hoped, allow Congress to address the problems caused
by the increasing integration of the national economy while protecting other important
constitutional values: free trade among the states, freedom of contract, and federalism.
Like the Supreme Court,257 Knox was committed to protecting free trade among
the states, as his discussion of Kidd’s Principles of Western Civilisation makes clear.258
His notes highlight his hope that antitrust law would ensure a market free of both fraud
and monopoly.259 In summarizing his understanding of Kidd’s argument, Knox wrote
that “[w]hat is needed for the right development is free play for all forces, a free con-
flict; but free in the sense that liberty is freedom under law and not license for the sport
of the strongest and most unrestrained forces.”260 That freedom would come “by con-
trolling the conditions of competition,”261 which would result in curtailing “[t]hose
processes of organization and management . . . by which . . . legitimate investors are
fleeced, capitalization dishonestly inflated in the interests of promoters, and the great
prizes are always for the most unscrupulous.”262 He even explicitly tied his concern
with free trade to the harmless items limit in his Yale Law Journal article. “If prohibi-
tion of interstate trade is within the arbitrary power of Congress,” he wrote, “it might
be exercised so as to exclude the products of particular states or sections of the country.
Congress then might prohibit the shipment of cotton or wheat to promote the interests
of wool or corn.”263
Today, this concern with interstate protectionism may seem overdrawn. Congress,
with representatives of all the states, might be thought unlikely to use its commerce
power to advance the parochial economic interests of one group or region. In the early
257 See supra Part V.A.
258 Knox, supra note 153.
259 Id. at 4.
260 Id. at 2.
261 Id. at 3.
262 Id. at 4.
263 Knox, supra note 15, at 147.
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twentieth century, however, this concern would have been a serious one. Political par-
ties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were highly regional parties that,
because of the uneven economic development of the nation, represented quite different
economic interests. As a result, a Congress controlled by Republicans used its power
to regulate foreign commerce to pass a tariff that advantaged the economic interests
of their constituents in the North and West to the detriment of the South.264
The result was constant conflict between Republican supporters of the tariff and
Democratic opponents, furious that Congress was using its power to regulate foreign
commerce to disadvantage their constituents. Claims that this use of the commerce
power was unconstitutional were common, but unsuccessful.265 In such a context,
concerns that Congress might use the authority to prohibit the interstate shipment of
goods to advantage one set of economic interests over another would have seemed
serious indeed.
The harmless items limit addressed that concern by limiting the exercise of the
federal police power to cases in which there was a clear connection between the pro-
hibition and a legitimate end. If the good itself was harmful, then it would clearly cause
harm in the state to which the good was shipped. The prohibition would thus seem to
be an attempt to address a legitimate problem that the Supreme Court was already try-
ing to address through its Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.266 On the other hand,
if the good itself was not harmful then it was possible—even likely in the context of
early twentieth-century politics—that the prohibition was not an attempt to solve a
problem created by degenerative competition, but was instead an attempt by Congress
to favor the interests of one industry, or one region, over the other.267
The tight fit the harmless items limit required between the harm caused by the inter-
state shipment of a good and the actual shipment of goods in interstate commerce that
Thomas Reed Powell complained of was thus not a senseless oversight, at least not for
Knox.268 It was justified in part by an expectation that such a tight fit was necessary
to prevent Congress from misusing the federal police power to advance parochial over
national interests. It was simply an extension of the policy concern that had driven the
Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine for decades.
C. Freedom of Contract and the Commerce Clause in 1906
Knox’s concern with free trade was not the only reason he was willing to accept the
under-inclusiveness of the harmless items limit. His concern with protecting freedom
of contract was also important. Knox was not oblivious to problems of labor. He led the
264 JOHN GERRING, PARTY IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1828–1996, at 65, 68–69 (1998).
265 Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1799–
1802 (2008).
266 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
267 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
268 See POWELL, supra note 8, at 180.
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fight for the Federal Employers Liability Act,269 and in 1908 was seen as labor’s can-
didate for the Republican Party presidential nomination.270 But throughout his career,
Knox supported freedom of contract.271 That support is important because of an under-
appreciated relationship between the Supreme Court’s freedom of contract doctrine and
its Commerce Clause doctrine. That relationship meant that Knox believed the harm-
less items limit was necessary to ensure that the Commerce Clause was not used to
make an end run around the restrictions of liberty of contract.
The reason Knox’s concern with protecting freedom of contract pushed him to sup-
port the harmless items limit may, at first glance, seem clear. Hammer v. Dagenhart,
after all, used the approach to strike down a federal law regulating the employment of
children.272 But upon closer inspection the connection between those doctrines is hard
to locate. Both state courts and the Supreme Court agreed that laws regulating the em-
ployment of children did not violate freedom of contract, although maximum hour,
minimum wage, and other regulations of the employment relationship for most adult
men did.273 When the issue came before the Supreme Court in 1913, the Court fol-
lowed the lead of state courts274 and unanimously upheld the state regulation of child
labor.275 In addition, the Fifth Amendment limited Congress’s exercise of its commerce
269 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
271 Knox, supra note 15. One example of Knox’s lifelong support for freedom of contract
was his critique of the Adamson Act in 1916, which was passed to avert a nationwide railroad
strike. Adamson Act of 1916, 45 U.S.C. §§ 65–66 (repealed 1996); see Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 376 (Pitney, J., dissenting) (mentioning in his dissenting opinion that the Adamson
Act should be invalidated and that “[t]he suggestion that it was passed to prevent a threatened
strike” gives it no greater legal effect); Comment, Federal Protection of Collective Bargaining
under the Railway Act of 1926, 40 YALE L.J. 92, 95 n.20 (1930). It established that eight hours
would qualify as a full day’s work for purposes of calculating wages on interstate railroads. 45
U.S.C. § 65. Knox attacked the Act with traditional freedom of contract arguments. Philander
C. Knox, Speech of Hon. Philander C. Knox, at a Republican Mass Meeting, New York City
(Oct. 19, 1916), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12. He wrote that:
[t]he immediate effect of the successful establishment of the power to
destroy contracts between employer and employed and to fix the wages
for which the employed shall work is to invite a struggle between those
classes to control congress in order to control wages, the direful conse-
quences of which need to be enlarged upon. . . . [T]he exercise of such
power [may be] even more disastrous as it involves the surrender of indi-
vidual liberty and the relegation of the citizen to conditions of slavery and
peonage . . . . Slavery to congress is just as slavery to the individual . . . . 
Id. at 5–6.
272 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1917).
273 See Julie Novkov, Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle
over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369, 372–73 (2000) (detailing state
efforts to regulate child labor and state courts’ approval of such regulations).
274 Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913).
275 Id.
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power, and the right to freedom of contract was protected by the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.276 Nevertheless, the fact that the harmless item limit ensured that
Congress could not use its commerce power to invade the right to freedom of contract
that the Court would enforce most famously in Lochner v. New York277 was a crucial
reason that limit was supported by Knox and others.
The reason Congress’s commerce power needed to be limited in order to protect
freedom of contract was a doctrinal relationship between the Supreme Court’s freedom
of contract doctrines and its Commerce Clause doctrine in the early twentieth century
first identified by Barry Cushman.278 That relationship can be clearly seen in the Court’s
late nineteenth-century antitrust decisions.279 Those decisions established that the free-
dom of contract protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clauses did not
apply to legitimate regulations of interstate commerce.280 Or, as Progressive Era law-
yers would have understood it, if a law was a legitimate regulation of commerce then
it was not, by definition, a violation of freedom of contract. To be clear, it was defini-
tively established that the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, applied to reg-
ulations of commerce.281 But the Court’s antitrust decisions established that freedom of
contract was a special case because the substantive right of the freedom of contract was
determined by the extent of legitimate government power.282 The Fifth Amendment
thus limited the exercise of Congress’s commerce power, but the scope of the com-
merce power helped determine the scope of the substantive right to freedom of contract:
if a regulation was a legitimate regulation of interstate commerce then, by definition,
it was not a violation of freedom of contract and therefore would not be struck down
on due process grounds.283
276 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
277 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
278 CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION 109–12 (1998); Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas:
The Case of the Yellow-Dog Contract, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 235, 238–43 (1992).
279 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
280 See Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 505; Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 290.
281 See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336, 345 (1893)
(applying the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to require the United States to pay for prop-
erty taken pursuant to its commerce power).
282 Id.
283 See Editorial, Liberty of Contract and the Commerce Clause, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 301,
302 (1908) (“Congress may make police regulations with regard to those matters expressly
entrusted to its care, even though incidentally it abrogate freedom of contract.”); Comment, The
Unconstitutionality of the Erdmann [sic] Act of 1898, 17 YALE L.J. 614, 614 (1908) (coupling
the Court’s rationale of upholding freedom of contract with not finding a proper regulation
of commerce in deciding Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)). Failing to separate the
question of how the Commerce Clause affects the scope of the substantive right of freedom
of contract from the question of whether the Fifth Amendment applies to exercises of the 
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The idea that a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power over interstate commerce
could not violate freedom of contract was supported by the social contract perspective
of most Progressive Era lawyers and judges.284 From that perspective, government
authority was not organic. It did not emerge directly from the existence of society. It
was, instead, created by society to serve specific ends.285 Government authority was not,
for example, like that of a parent over a child, which extends to all areas of the child’s
life, and which is arguably justified by the relationship between the parent and the
child. It was like that of a voluntary association, whose authority is limited to the spe-
cific purposes for which the association was created. Your chess club, for example, can
disqualify you from the club tournament for cheating, but it cannot stop you from
changing jobs.
The freedom of contract doctrine of Lochner emerged from that same perspec-
tive.286 State regulations that advanced police power purposes—the health, safety,
morality, or general welfare of the community—were legitimate, because state gov-
ernments were created to pursue those ends. But regulations that went beyond those
purposes—that, for example, aimed to simply take property from one person and pass
it to another or that arbitrarily limited an adult male’s contractual rights—were illegiti-
mate because the Justices believed government was not created to advance such ends.287
Freedom of contract in the Lochner era was never absolute.288 Legitimate police regu-
lations regularly interfered with individual contracts,289 but since they were legitimate
police regulations they by definition did not violate freedom of contract. What the
Progressive Era Court understood itself to be doing in its freedom of contract cases
was separating laws that served legitimate government ends from those that did not.290
“Freedom of contract” was a convenient term for the category of private activity whose
regulation was not within the scope of proper government authority. It was a deriva-
tive category. It was the activity “left over” after proper government police regulations
were exhausted.
At the federal level in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Com-
merce Clause played a similar role to the states’ police power. The federal government,
no more than the states, could pass regulations that went beyond the ends it was created
to serve.291 But since “freedom of contract” was a derivative category, any legitimate
commerce power was what Frank Goodnow (perhaps purposely) confused. See FRANK J.
GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 88–89 (1911).
284 See FISS, supra note 184, at 159–65.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
288 Id. at 53–54.
289 See Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM.
L. REV. 294 (1913) (providing an extensive list of valid regulations from various states).
290 Id. at 311–12 (citing Schmidinger v. Chicago, 225 U.S. 578 (1913)).
291 FISS, supra note 184, at 159.
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exercise of federal power would, by definition, not interfere with that liberty. If a regu-
lation of interstate commerce was legitimate, it meant that the rule did not interfere with
state prerogatives. It also meant that it did not improperly invade the protected pri-
vate sphere.292 In this system, an unalterably private sphere still existed. “Freedom of
contract” and other doctrines outlined its limits. But because the Constitution expressly
gave the federal government the authority to regulate interstate commerce, such reg-
ulations did not invade that private sphere.293 Any legitimate regulation of interstate
commerce thus could not, by definition, interfere with “freedom of contract.”294
This was not an understanding that was merely theoretical. It was at the center of
the Court’s antitrust decisions between the 1896 decision in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Railway,295 and 1911, in United States v. American Tobacco Company.296
During that period, the Supreme Court had adopted a “literalist” interpretation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act’s prohibition on “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of trade.”297
That statutory language, the Court held, meant what it said.298 It did not just prohibit
contracts that unreasonably restrained trade; it prohibited all contracts that restrained
trade, whether reasonable or not.299 By holding that Congress could prohibit reason-
able contracts, that interpretation imperiled freedom of contract, an argument made the
following year, in United States v. Joint Traffic Association,300 by a railroad that had
been sued for violation of the Sherman Act.301 “The right of the individual to make
contracts regarding his own affairs,” argued the railroad, was guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.302 That right, it claimed, citing the central decisions
292 Id. at 160.
293 Id. at 163–64.
294 The last three paragraphs follow the analysis of Professor Fiss. See FISS, supra note 184,
at 157–79. See also GILLMAN, supra note 55, at 54–55 (“[The] Justices were expressing a com-
mitment to a well-defined and long standing but largely neglected feature of early American
political culture: a belief among elites and state managers that the exercise of public power
should be limited to those goals and purposes that truly advanced the interests of the ‘community
as a whole’ or the ‘general welfare’ and not the ‘factional,’ ‘special,’ ‘private,’ ‘unequal,’
‘selfish,’ ‘class,’ or ‘partial’ interests of certain groups or classes.”);WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 107–12 (1998); Les Benedict, supra note 54, at
327–31. But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 55 (arguing that Lochner was grounded not in concerns
with class legislation but in precedent and a natural rights tradition).
295 166 U.S. 209 (1897).
296 The Supreme Court famously exchanged its literalist understanding of the Sherman Act
for the “rule of reason” in United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106, 179–80
(1911) and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1911).
297 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 609 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2004)).
298 Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 312.
299 Id. at 340–41.
300 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
301 Id.
302 Brief for the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey at 3, Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S.
505 (No. 341).
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establishing the freedom of contract, “can be limited only so far as may be requisite for
the security or welfare of society—by the exercise of the police power.”303 Because
reasonable contracts in restraint of trade are not prejudicial to the security or welfare
of society, it concluded, Congress lacked the authority to prohibit such contracts.304
The Court, however, rejected this argument on the grounds that freedom of con-
tract could not be violated by a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power over interstate
commerce.305 “The power to regulate commerce,” Justice Peckham admitted, “does
not carry with it the right to destroy or impair those limitations and guarantees which
are also placed in the Constitution,” limitations which included, “the liberty of the citi-
zen to pursue any livelihood or vocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
which might be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out those objects to a
successful conclusion.”306 According to Peckham, however, this principle did not in-
validate the law. He rejected the defendant’s claim by defining the right to freedom of
contract as limited by Congress’s authority to regulate commerce:
The citizen may have the right to make a proper (that is, a lawful)
contract . . . [but t]he question which arises here is, whether the
contract is a proper or lawful one, and we have not advanced a
step towards its solution by saying that the citizen is protected by
the Fifth, or any other amendment, in his right to make proper
contracts to enable him to carry out his lawful purposes. . . . .
Notwithstanding the general liberty of contract which is pos-
sessed by the citizen under the Constitution, we find that there
are many kinds of contracts which, while not in themselves im-
moral or mala in se, may yet be prohibited by the legislation of
the States or, in certain cases, by Congress. The question comes
back whether the statute under review is a legitimate exercise of
the power of Congress over interstate commerce and a valid regu-
lation thereof.307
This approach to the limits of freedom of contract was followed in later antitrust
cases. In 1899, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Company v. United States,308 Peckham wrote
again for the majority, which this time was unanimous, reinforcing his position from
303 Id. The brief especially emphasized Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), which
established that the Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty of contract, as well as a plethora
of state cases, including People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1888) and Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886). Id. at 4–6.
304 Id. at 2.
305 Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 571.
306 Id. at 571–72.
307 Id. at 572–73.
308 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Joint Traffic Association.309 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, he wrote, did
not stop Congress from prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade.310 “On the contrary,”
he continued:
we think the provision regarding the liberty of the citizen is, to
some extent, limited by the commerce clause of the Constitution,
and that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
comprises the right to enact a law prohibiting the citizen from en-
tering into those private contracts which directly and substantially,
and not merely indirectly, remotely, incidentally and collaterally,
regulate to a greater or less degree commerce among the States.311
That relationship was at the center of the government’s defense of the constitu-
tionality of the Erdman Act312 in 1907. The Erdman Act was passed in the wake of the
Pullman Strike of 1894313 and was aimed to decrease the tension between labor and
management that had sparked that strike and thereby effectively shut down the nation’s
railroads. In Adair v. United States,314 a railroad challenged the provision that prohib-
ited interstate railroads from firing employees who had joined a union.315 The gov-
ernment first sought to establish that the Act was a regulation of commerce because
protecting unionized workers would prevent strikes that would interfere with interstate
commerce.316 It then turned to the Fifth Amendment freedom of contract question. It
recognized and accepted the existence of freedom of contract but argued that “the right
of individuals or corporations to make contracts and do business is at all times subser-
vient to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”317 Looking back at
the Court’s antitrust decisions, the government argued that the Sherman Act was upheld
even though it “forbid[s], not only contracts which were . . . unreasonable restraint[s]
of interstate trade and commerce, but those which were reasonable in their nature,”
demonstrating, it argued (citing the Court’s language from Joint Traffic Association),
that freedom of contract did not restrict legitimate regulations of commerce.318 Because
the government believed the Erdman Act was a valid regulation of interstate commerce,
it concluded that it was constitutional regardless of freedom of contract.319
309 Id. at 228.
310 Id. at 228–29.
311 Id. at 229.
312 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
313 ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR AND MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
LAW 12 (1976).
314 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
315 Id. at 170.
316 Brief for the United States at 12, Adair, 208 U.S. 161 (No. 293).
317 Id. at 21.
318 Id. at 21–24.
319 Id. at 19–37.
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The Court’s decision in Adair struck down the Erdman Act, but accepted the prin-
ciple that a legitimate regulation of interstate commerce did not, by definition, violate
liberty of contract.320 Justice Harlan’s opinion for the majority first established that the
Act was a violation of freedom of contract.321 He then noted the government’s argu-
ment that a regulation of commerce could not be a violation of the Fifth Amendment,
and instead of rejecting that argument outright—by stating, for example, that freedom
of contract constrained Congress’s commerce power—he rejected the argument on the
grounds that the provisions of the Erdman Act at issue did not qualify as regulations
of interstate commerce. Harlan then explained why the provision was not, in fact, a
regulation of commerce.322
Legal treatises recognized this relationship as well. Frederick Cooke’s The Com-
merce Clause of the Federal Constitution recognized Congress’s commerce power
was limited by the Fifth Amendment and agreed that “the word ‘liberty’ as [used in the
Fifth Amendment] is not ‘confined to the mere liberty of person, but includes, among
others, a right to enter into certain classes of contracts for the purpose of enabling the
citizen to carry on his business.’”323 But he also recognized that “such constitutional
guaranty does not prevent Congress, in the exercise of power under the commerce
clause, from legislating, even by way of prohibition, upon the subject of such contracts
in respect to commerce within the scope thereof, as ‘directly affect and regulate that
commerce.’”324 For support, Cooke cited Addyston Pipe.325
The understanding that legitimate regulations of commerce could not violate free-
dom of contract meant that the proper scope of the Commerce Clause had implications
not just for the distribution of power between the states and the federal government,
but also for the distribution of power between the public and private sphere. An ex-
pansion of the subjects the Commerce Clause could regulate would not only expand
the scope of federal power, it would permit Congress to bypass the restrictions of
freedom of contract.
That possibility contributed to Knox’s support of the harmless items limit even
though that limit allowed Congress to solve only some of the collective action prob-
lems created by the increasing integration of the national economy. The relationship to
freedom of commerce meant that without a limit to the federal police power Congress
could effectively bypass the restrictions of freedom of contract by prohibiting the in-
terstate shipment of goods produced by men who worked more than eight hours a
320 Adair, 208 U.S. at 180.
321 Id. at 172.
322 Id. at 176–79; see also Cushman, supra note 278, at 235 (discussing the Erdman Act and
Adair as the origin of a body of doctrine seeking to resolve the tension between the Commerce
Clause and due process).
323 FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 68–69
(1908).
324 Id. at 69.
325 Id. (citing Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
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day. Given Knox’s commitment to freedom of contract, he would have seen that as
a disaster and a powerful reason to support the harmless items limit.
D. The Harmless Items Limit and Progressive Era Federalism
Concern with protecting freedom of contract and free trade among the States helps
explain why Knox supported the harmless items limit. As the previous subparts have
argued, the harmless items limit served Knox’s twin goals of ensuring that Congress
could not interfere with a unified national market without good reason or use its com-
merce power to make an end run around the requirements of freedom of contract.
Those may have been reason enough for Knox to support the rule even though it al-
lowed Congress to address only some of the collective action problems generated by
the increasing integration of the national economy. But any doubts he had about the
costs of an under-inclusive rule were further assuaged by his concerns with protecting
space for meaningful local politics and a hope that interstate cooperation could solve
some of the collective action problems the harmless items limit stopped Congress
from addressing.
Knox believed federalism itself protected important values, as he made clear in
a 1908 speech on the battlefield at Gettysburg.326 At the site of that great national
victory—about which Knox, as a Pennsylvanian, would have had no ambivalence—
he emphasized the important role of the states in American government.327 He praised
the sacrifice of the soldiers and the end of slavery, but he also encouraged his listeners
to “jealously guard” the system of American federalism from people “interested in the
accomplishment of laudable aims [who have] become impatient and restive under the
checks and balances and boundaries which control and harmonize our system.”328
“[T]his tendency,” Knox said:
threatened seriously to disturb the just relations between the State
and Federal governments. Impatient of the difficulties and delays
which must attend the action of separate States in the accomplish-
ment of their objects, some of the people have seemed to feel that
by an assumption of Federal power, or by ignoring State power,
their aims could be speedily and fully obtained.329
Knox urged his listeners to resist that tendency. Americans, he argued, must keep each
of the “dual governments . . . within its own sphere, untrammeled and uncontrolled
326 Philander C. Knox, Memorial Address by Hon. Philander C. Knox on the Battlefield
of Gettysburg 18–21 (May 30, 1908), in THE KNOX PAPERS, supra note 12.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 17–18.
329 Id. at 18.
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by the other.”330 “This Government,” he wrote, “is not seriously threatened by
Anarchy . . . . Our peril is to be found in weak or insidious acquiescence by our
public servants in specious demands for inroads upon the established and tried in-
stitutions of our country sometimes made in the name of reform, sometimes mas-
querading as justice.”331
Knox did not pause to detail the functions federalism served, but there were
multiple reasons people in his period supported federalism. Most scholars have em-
phasized the importance of federalism’s ability to protect liberty.332 Owen Fiss’s
review of the Waite Court, for example, posits that the Court in the late nineteenth
century believed local governance protected by a federal system was more likely to
protect liberty because it gave individuals a larger say in the rules that governed them
and would permit them, if necessary, to move to places where they agreed with the
local consensus.333 But in the early twentieth century it is clear this was not the sole
support for federalism or perhaps even the dominant justification. Many lawyers,
politicians, and intellectuals on both the left and right were concerned with protecting
federalism because they believed meaningful local politics were necessary to create
the kind of citizens capable of productive participation in national politics.334
Though Progressives are often portrayed as proponents of increased bureaucratic
and state power, many also remained concerned with preserving local political in-
volvement. Progressives were the driving force behind the creation of the Federal
Trade Commission,335 the Federal Reserve Board,336 the strengthening of the Interstate
Commerce Commission,337 and other state-building projects, as well as significant
reforms of the political system, including the extension of the vote to women338 and the
direct election of senators.339 They rarely, however, criticized the states as states. They
challenged the direct election of senators, not the anti-democratic way the Senate dis-
tributes votes.340 They added little to the century-old critique of localism that began
with Federalist Number 10, and many Progressives, including Louis Brandeis and
330 Id. at 19.
331 Id. at 21.
332 See, e.g., FISS, supra note 184; Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It
Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513 (2002).
333 FISS, supra note 184, at 258.
334 See generally Martha Derthick & John J. Dinan, Progressivism and Federalism, in
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE NEW DEMOCRACY 81–102 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur
eds., 1999).
335 AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 258–59 (2010).
336 Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of How the
Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial
Crisis, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109, 114–15 (2010).
337 RANA, supra note 335, at 258–59.
338 Id. at 259.
339 Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism
and China’s Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 367–68 (2011).
340 Derthick & Dinan, supra note 334, at 91.
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New Nationalist Herbert Croly affirmatively praised the opportunities the States pro-
vided for policy experimentation.341
Woodrow Wilson personifies the tension in Progressive thought between the sup-
port of increased federal power and a republican emphasis on the importance of the
virtues produced by meaningful local politics. Wilson successfully advocated the cre-
ation of national administrative institutions like the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Trade Commission, and his late conversion to support for federal child labor regu-
lation was critical to its passage, but he also commonly argued for the benefits of de-
centralized authority:
Moral and social questions originally left to the several States for
settlement can be drawn into the field of federal authority only
at the expense of the self-dependence and efficiency of the sev-
eral communities of which our complex body politic is made up.
Paternal morals, morals enforced by the judgment and choices of
the central authority at Washington, do not and cannot create vital
habits or methods of life unless sustained by local opinion and
purpose, local prejudice and convenience,—unless supported by
local convenience and interest; and only communities capable of
taking care of themselves will, taken together, constitute a nation
capable of vital action and control. You cannot atrophy the parts
without atrophying the whole.342
Elihu Root, a close adviser of President Roosevelt and a proponent of his New
Nationalism, shared Wilson’s ambivalence. At the first National Conference of Gov-
ernors, Root compared the states to the nations of Europe to emphasize their individual
sovereignty and their increasing interdependence.343 The “forty-six sovereign states,”
were lagging behind European nations that were effectively cooperating to solve their
common problems. American states should follow the Europeans’ example and use
their sovereign powers “with a wise regard for the common interest, upon conference,
upon complete understanding of the duties of good neighborhood.”344 Only such coop-
eration would remove the “continu[ed] pressure to force the National Government into
the performance of the duties that the states ought to perform.”345
Root’s speech also suggests another reason lawyers like him and Knox would have
supported a harmless items rule that seemed clearly under-inclusive. As Root’s speech
suggests, many Progressives believed their ambivalence about federal power could be
resolved by interstate cooperation. One example was a popular Progressive proposal
341 Id. at 92.
342 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1908).
343 ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 372–73 (Robert Bacon
& James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
344 Id. at 373.
345 Id.
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that Root regularly advanced: the passage of uniform state legislation. The American
Bar Association supported the approach and state legislatures created a Commission on
Uniform State Laws.346 Using the approach to address workman’s compensation laws
garnered the support of both the American Association for Labor Legislation and the
National Civic Federation, a business group.347 President Roosevelt’s call for the first
National Conference of Governors in 1908 was intended to encourage the states to co-
operate to address conservation policy, and provides further evidence of the Progressive
emphasis on interstate cooperation.
Progressives’ expectations for interstate cooperation built on a sanguine hope that
advances in technology and communication would increasingly integrate not only the
economy but also the body politic. A variety of Progressive social theorists, including
Mary Follett, James Dewey, Jane Addams, and Josiah Royce, believed that changes in
communication and technology could redeem American politics by uniting the nation
in the search for the common good. But the active involvement of individuals in mean-
ingful local politics was crucial to the creation of a unified national community that
placed the public good above selfish interests. Mary Follett’s praise of the commu-
nity created by urban neighborhoods, Dewey’s concern with community centers, and
Addams’s work on social centers were all justified as ways to create an active citizenry
capable of acting for the common good.348
This strong commitment to federalism was thus another wellspring of Knox’s
support for the harmless items limit. It, along with his support for freedom of con-
tract and free trade among the states, provided powerful reasons for Knox’s belief that
Congress’s authority to prohibit interstate commerce needed to be limited. What that
means is that even though the harmless items limit has seemed incoherent as policy
to commentators for nearly a century, it was for Knox and the many others who shared
his concerns not just coherent but wise. The harmless items limit did not interfere with
Congress’s authority to address the most pressing problems caused by the increasing
integration of the national economy—most important among them the trusts. It pre-
served sufficient space for meaningful local politics that would produce a democratic
people while preventing Congress from interfering with free trade or freedom of con-
tract. And any fear that the harmless items limit was under-inclusive was blunted by
the broadly shared hope in the potential of cooperative state action.
VI. PHILANDER KNOX, THE HARMLESS ITEMS LIMIT, AND THE CREATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
At the base of the traditional story of Hammer v. Dagenhart is an understanding
of constitutional development that centers on the Supreme Court. Though rarely made
346 Graebner, supra note 4, at 334, 351.
347 Id. at 349–50.
348 See generally JEAN B. QUANDT, FROM THE SMALL TOWN TO THE GREAT COMMUNITY
(1970).
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explicit, the assumption that the Court itself was the primary actor is implicit in the
criticism directed at the Court for making what is commonly understood to be an
abrupt about face.349 This assumption is in part justified. The Hammer majority did
endorse the harmless items rule and lodge it in the United States Reports. They could
have chosen another path; that is exactly what the four dissenters did. Nothing made
the majority’s choice inevitable.
Yet, the Justices were not the only important actors, and were perhaps not even
the most important. Others contributed to the outcome by determining the options pre-
sented to the Court, by shaping the legislative and judicial precedents the Court had to
analyze, and by creating a broadly shared understanding of the limits of Congress’s
commerce power. Others, that is, created the arguments that convinced the Court that
the harmless items limit was correct and pushed Congress towards a decade of legis-
lation that confirmed it. Among those others, Knox was crucial. As much as anyone,
he created the doctrinal system adopted by the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
There is no straight line between Knox’s 1908 article in the Yale Law Journal
and the decision in Hammer. There were, importantly, two changes that significantly
undermined the justification for the harmless items limit. First, in 1908, there was sub-
stantial hope that interstate cooperation could solve many of the collective action prob-
lems caused by degenerative competition. By 1918, that hope had dimmed, a change
that would have made the under-inclusiveness of the harmless items limit seem more
problematic.350 Second, at least some important political and constitutional actors be-
lieved the doctrinal relationship between freedom of contract and Congress’s commerce
power had changed.351 In 1908, everyone agreed that the commerce power could be
used to make an end run around the restrictions of freedom of contract. By 1918, the
status of that assumption was no longer clear. Some had begun to believe that, to the
contrary, a legitimate regulation of commerce could still be unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated freedom of contract. That change undermined the harmless
items limit because it suggested protecting freedom of contract no longer required
limiting the reach of Congress’s commerce power.
Evidence of that change is clear from a comparison of the debates over the
Beveridge Child Labor Bill in 1907, and the Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill in 1914.
In 1907, Albert Beveridge, a fine lawyer and committed advocate of a federal child
labor regulation, submitted a bill to Congress that looked very much like the Keating-
Owen Act at issue in Hammer. In debates on the floor of the Senate he received sig-
nificant constitutional challenges to his bill but was able to successfully combat the
349 See supra notes 48–50.
350 Graebner, supra note 4, at 352–54 (examining the extent to which regulations were
uniform among the states by 1918).
351 Barry Cushman has pointed out areas where the Supreme Court applied the original
approach well into the 1930s. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note
278, at 123–38. But that understanding was no longer universally accepted. See discussion
infra notes 354–58.
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majority of them.352 But when he was asked whether his child labor bill would allow
the federal government to regulate the working conditions of adult men, he admitted it
would. He did so not because he supported such regulations—he did not—but because
he respected the implications of the rule that any legitimate regulation of interstate com-
merce was by definition consistent with liberty of contract. He accepted them because
he could find no way around it and that argument was one of the central weapons used
to defeat his bill.353
In 1916, however, debates over child labor regulation reflected that the relation-
ship between freedom of contract and the Commerce Clause had changed. Thomas
Parkinson, the Director of the Legislative Drafting Bureau at Columbia University and
a supporter of child labor regulation, made the point clear in his opening remarks at
hearings in 1916.354 “[T]he [constitutional] problem,” with the federal child labor bill,
he said, “is not only capable of division into two general parts, but it requires that
division, if we are to keep the precedents and our own consideration clear.”355 First,
“[w]hat are the respective jurisdictions of the Federal Government and the State gov-
ernments over commerce?”356 Second, “what are the respective rights and powers of
the Federal Government and the individual,” a question which “arises under the [F]ifth
[A]mendment to the Constitution.”357 Parkinson used that division to counter concerns
that the passage of a child labor law meant an adult labor law was also constitutional.
This decoupling of the Commerce Clause and freedom of contract doctrine and
the declining hope in interstate cooperation undermined two central supports for the
harmless items limit. No longer was limiting the reach of the commerce power nec-
essary to protect freedom of contract. And the dimmed hope that collective action
problems among the states could be solved with interstate cooperation made the
harmless items limit’s under-inclusiveness more problematic.
On the other hand, some support for the doctrine remained and new issues
emerged. Concerns remained that politicians might regulate interstate commerce in
ways that advanced their constituents’ own parochial interests at the expense of the
national interest. Certainly there were no indications that the Court was backing away
from its Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.358 In addition, by 1918, the nation was
352 See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
353 Logan Everett Sawyer III, Partisan Calculation, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming
2013).
354 See An Act to Prevent Interstate Commerce in the Products of Child Labor, and for
Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8234 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 64th
Cong. 113–52 (1916) (statement of Thomas I. Parkinson, Director of the Legislative Drafting
Bureau at Columbia University).
355 Id. at 114.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 See Post, supra note 332, at 1605 n.315 (noting that between 1921 and 1928, the
Supreme Court struck down more than half of the regulations challenged under the Dormant
Commerce Clause).
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recovering both from the exertions of World War I and from the remarkable centrali-
zation of authority in the federal government that war produced. The Wilson adminis-
tration, for example, effectively took control of the shipping, railroad, telephone, and
telegraph industries.359 It commandeered manufacturing plants, fixed prices for dozens
of commodities, and conscripted millions. Such centralization of authority, even if
effective, generated serious concern and may have pushed some judges towards tra-
ditional constitutional limits on federal power.360
Together, the changes between Knox’s article in 1908, and the Hammer litiga-
tion in 1916, both supported and undermined the original justification for the rule. For
some, the decoupling of freedom of contract and Commerce Clause doctrine, as well
as decreasing hopes for interstate cooperation, must have indicated the rule should be
abandoned. Others may have thought continuing concerns with parochial regulation
of commerce and the centralization produced by World War I suggested the rule should
be upheld. But what is crucial to see is that while those structural developments would
have affected support for some limit on federal power in 1918, they did not determine
what that limit would be. And while Justice Day and the Hammer majority had the
ultimate decision on that issue, they were not acting in a vacuum. In choosing a doc-
trinal rule, they looked at traditional sources for guidance: briefs of counsel, legisla-
tive history, and judicial precedent. And Knox played a critical role in shaping each
of those sources.
Knox did not write the briefs for the opponents of the Keating-Owen Act, but his
influence was clear. Appellee’s briefs advanced the harmless items limit that Knox had
helped create, propagate, and defend in Congress and in the pages of the Yale Law
Journal. That counsel chose that doctrinal structure should be unsurprising. Those
same arguments had been used by the opponents of federal child labor laws for over
a decade. They were used by the opponents of the Keating-Owen Act in 1916, of the
Palmer-Owen Act in the previous Congress, and the Beveridge Child Labor Bill in
1907 and 1908. In those last debates, Knox’s influence was particularly clear: he partic-
ipated in them personally and reminded his fellow senators that his work as Attorney
General gave him additional insight into the limits of the federal police power. Even
with the changed circumstances between Knox’s work propagating the harmless items
limit in the debates over the Beveridge Child Labor Bill, just the fact that this doctrinal
limit had been accepted by leading legislators and treatise writers for a decade must
have weighed heavily on counsel.
Knox’s influence did not just extend to the arguments counsel made to the Court.
It is also fair to say that his work influenced the context in which the Court evaluated
those arguments. A defining characteristic of the legal landscape when Hammer was
decided was that every decision that approved the federal police power could be charac-
terized as consistent with the harmless items limit. That alone gave Justices looking for
359 Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era,
78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (1998).
360 Post, supra note 332, at 1520. See also Post, supra note 359.
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a way to limit federal power encouragement to adopt that approach. That state of affairs,
however, did not occur by accident. Judicial precedent developed through statutes that
passed Congress, and because of the work of Knox and others, the only federal police
power statutes that passed Congress prior to the adoption of the Keating-Owen Child
Labor Act were arguably consistent with the harmless items limit.
Pursuant to the federal police power, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug
Act, the related meat inspection amendments, and the Mann Act. In debates over each
of those laws, most congressmen made arguments consistent with Knox’s understand-
ing of the federal police power. Knox himself took part in the earlier debates—over the
Pure Food and Drug Act and the meat inspection amendments. Prior to the contested
passage of the Keating-Owen Act, Congress also declined to pass laws that were incon-
sistent with the harmless items limit, and, just as importantly, declined to pass them on
the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The clearest example was the Beveridge
Child Labor Bill in 1907.
In sum, when it came time to decide Hammer, there was already a long line of
judicial and legislative precedent that was consistent with the harmless items limit.
And Knox’s support for both the federal police power and the harmless items limit as
a nationally respected lawyer, recognized through his experience as Attorney General
as deeply knowledgeable about those issues, helped establish that understanding. Even
if most senators and representatives were using constitutional arguments only as cover
for their real political motivations, Knox’s support for the harmless items limit in no
small way provided it.
CONCLUSION
To modern commentators, the harmless items limit is almost universally seen as
constitutionalizing a nonsensical policy. Putting aside the difficulties of determining
what goods were “intrinsically harmful,” they see no good reason the Constitution
should differentiate collective action problems involving the shipment of a harmful
good from those that do not. Because traditional sources do little to explain the emer-
gence of or rationale for the harmless items limit, those commentators have concluded
that the doctrine was an unprincipled invention of a laissez-faire Supreme Court.
Using untapped archival sources to recover the origin of what became the Hammer
doctrine, this paper has challenged that conclusion. The actions and ideas of Philander
Knox indicate that the harmless items limit was not an attempt to return America to an
imagined laissez-faire past. It was an effort by politically engaged lawyers to recon-
figure doctrinal structures to address the problems of a new century while preserving
existing protection for what they saw as important values. Knox and his contemporaries
wanted to change Commerce Clause doctrine just enough to address growing collective
action problems, but not so much as to threaten free trade, federalism, or freedom of
contract. Their solution was the harmless items limit.
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This new perspective extends the ongoing revision of the so-called “Lochner Era.”
The past several decades have seen a revolution in our understanding of the Supreme
Court at the turn of the twentieth century. Scholars have increasingly shown the doc-
trine of the period was not a result of the Court’s dedication to a pro-business, laissez-
faire economic order, but from abolitionist inspired ideas of free labor and a Jacksonian
concern with government neutrality.361 Yet the traditional understanding stubbornly
hangs on in many areas, perhaps in part because that revision has not yet provided a
convincing explanation for Hammer, which many see as a central pillar of the laissez-
faire interpretation.362 This paper attempts to provide that explanation.
This new perspective also supports the growing recognition that lawyers outside
judicial chambers shape the development of constitutional law. As part of the broader
interest in the Constitution outside the courts,363 scholars have been exploring the ways
that litigators impact constitutional development.364 They make clear that courts only
address issues raised by counsel, only consider facts shaped and even selected by coun-
sel, and only evaluate arguments counsel develops. Knox’s activities help extend those
insights by demonstrating the important role played by lawyers outside the courtroom
altogether.365 Knox was a superb litigator, but his primary contribution to Hammer was
as a policymaker and advisor to the President and Congress.
Finally, this new perspective also suggests lessons for contemporary constitutional
development. More than fifteen years before the decision in Hammer, Philander Knox
began to consider how concerns with the increasing integration of the national economy
could be balanced with the competing interests of federalism, free trade, and freedom
of contract, and then how those concerns could be integrated into existing Commerce
Clause doctrine. Through these efforts, Knox can fairly be credited with creating the
Hammer doctrine, yet until the decision was handed down, a focus on the Court itself
would reveal only faint traces of his efforts. As we are again considering what limits
there are to Congress’s commerce authority, that story is worth remembering. Then, as
now, the ideology of Supreme Court Justices was enormously important. But Knox’s
story demonstrates how focusing on the Court alone can obscure both larger structural
forces and the role lawyers play in directing those forces. Now, as then, if we hope to
understand constitutional development, we need to look beyond the Court.
361 See supra Part IV.B.
362 See supra Introduction and Part IV.B.
363 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
364 See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR (1995); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST
PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).
365 These issues have been explored by others, but only rarely. See, e.g., PETER H. IRONS,
THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 4–6, 10–13 (1982).
